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Japanese homogeneity and processes of racialisation and their effects on the Korean population living in Japan

Introduction

I have decided to focus on Japan as part of this research into the processes of racialisation within a country outside of the UK. Japan is an interesting country to look at when researching the different processes of racialisation in different countries as it frequently claims that it is a homogenous, raceless society (Iwabuchi and Takezawa, 2015), despite this statement being politically incorrect. According to the Central Intelligence Agency (2015), 98.5% of the Japanese population are Japanese, 0.5% are Koreans, 0.4% are Chinese, and 0.6% are other. This demonstrates that the numbers of foreigners living in Japan are small; however, there are still large numbers of Koreans and Chinese living there. An OHCHR report by the UN (2005) concluded that there is racial discrimination and xenophobia in Japan which affects three groups; the Buraku people, the Ainu and the people of Okinawa, descendents of Japanese colonies (Koreans and Chinese), and foreigners and migrants from other Asian countries and from the rest of the world. Minorities are marginalised through their access to education, employment, health and housing (OHCHR, 2005). There is no national legislation that outlaws racial discrimination and provides a judicial remedy for the victims of racial prejudices (OHCHR, 2005). Iwabuchi and Takezawa (2015) argue that the Japanese government is reluctant to admit that there is a problem of racial discrimination, and they have internalised scientific discourses that racism is between 'blacks' and 'whites' in Africa and America.

Weiner (1996) argues that the Japanese focus on 'biological superiority' means that groups of people living in Japan who are not pure Japanese are classed as inferior races. In Japan there is the 'self' (Japanese) and 'others', which makes it difficult for discriminated groups to become fully integrated into society (Weiner, 1996). According to Arudou (2015), Japan's government and society are permeated by the narrative that people must "look Japanese" before they can expect equal treatment. Employers and landlords may refuse an individual based on the fact they are not Japanese, and foreign people are seen as 'temporary' residents who can never really belong in Japanese society (Aroudou, 2015). Arudou (2015) also found that racism in Japan is more subtle and embedded than in other countries, government opinion polls have shown that many Japanese believe that foreigners should not receive the same human rights as them.

Throughout this essay I am going to focus my research on the racial discrimination that Koreans receive when living in Japan. To begin I will discuss the history between these two countries which led to the concept of Koreans being an 'inferior' race. To do this I will focus on the period between 1910 and 1945 when Japan annexed Korea. I will discuss the experiences of Koreans living in Japan during and after this period and how the discrimination has changed over time. I will then look at the education that is provided for Korean children in Japan, in particular Korean ethnic schools that have been created since the end of the colonial rule of Japan, and the difficulties that these schools face. Thirdly, I will focus on hate speech directed towards Koreans living in Japan. I will discuss the rise in internet hate and activism, in particular a group known as 'Net Uyoku', and the activist group 'Zaitokukai'. Finally, I will turn my attention to the minority groups that experience discrimination in Japan. I will focus on the Ainu and Buraku people, and will look at the historical context in which they came to be marginalised and whether this situation has improved for them or not.

The historical context beginning from the colonial period of 1910-1945 in which racial discrimination towards Koreans emerged

To understand how Zainichi Koreans are frequently discriminated against and seen as an 'underclass' in Japanese society, we must consider the history between these two countries, in particularly the

events that occurred during the Second World War. Throughout this section I will discuss the period from 1910 and onwards, which will allow me to develop a starting point for the origins of how the Japanese see Koreans as an inferior race.

In 1910 Japan occupied Korea, which became a Japanese province for 35 years (OHCHR, 2005). During this time, Korean people were deprived of their national identities and incorporated into the Japanese nation (Tamura, 2003). The annexation of Korea dispossessed Koreans of their land, and drove young farmers from depressed regions of Korea into Osaka and Kobe to perform simple manual labour (Shipper, 2010). It was not until the last decade of Japan's colonial rule of Korea that their rule became heavy-handed and oppressive (Afe.easia.columbia.edu, 2016). Koreanhistory.info (2016) argue that Japan aimed to integrate Koreans into Japanese society as an underclass, which provides us with evidence that the discrimination and inferiority of Zainichi Koreans developed during Japan's colonial rule from 1910-45. During the 30's, Japan began to erase Korean national identity by banning the use of the Korean language in schools, and requiring Koreans to adapt Japanese names (Koreanhistory.info, 2016). Japan also wanted to distinguish the idea of 'Koreanness' by making Japanese the official language, placing Japanese people in all top governmental positions, and shutting down outspoken newspapers (Koreanhistory.info, 2016). During this time, Koreans were also forced to work in Japanese factories, and tens of thousands of young Korean women were drafted as "comfort women" (sexual slaves) for Japanese soldiers (Afe.easia.columbia.edu, 2016). According to an OHCHR report (2005), the Koreans were considered as inferior and could only work in subaltern jobs. Their liberties were suppressed and the use of the Korean language was discouraged, and then forbidden in 1940 (OHCHR, 2005).

In the 1930's, many Koreans were brought to Japan when they needed to replace their own people in the war effort (Minority Rights Group, 2016). Shipper (2010) claims that the 1938 Mobilization Law was brought in which aimed to mobilize the population in support of World War II. Korean labourers were brought to Japan to fill the labour power vacuum created by the expansion of Japan's military forces (Shipper, 2010). The law provided conscription if not enough volunteers were obtained, and in 1944 the Diet enacted A Reform Bill for Military Duties under which all Korean men were subject to mobilization (Shipper, 2010). Motani (2012) argues that the fact that the Korean minority were forced to come to Japan at the time of Japan's annexation led to the view of Koreans being inferior to the Japanese. The Minority Rights Group (2016) claim that these Koreans held Japanese citizenship during the occupation period. According to the Teikoku Tokei Nenkan (Statistical Yearbook of the Empire), there had only been 790 Koreans in Japan in 1909, the year before the annexation (Tamura, 2003). Tai (2008) argues that when forced labour was put into place in 1939 there were 2 million Koreans in Japan by the end of World War II. The majority of Koreans living in Japan today are offspring of those that stayed in Japan after the end of the colonisation period (Tai, 2008). After the war, 620,000 Koreans chose to stay in Japan due to the economic recession in Korea and the fact that they were only allowed to take 1000 yen back with them (Minority Rights Group, 2016) (Motani, 2012). The San Francisco Peace Treaty 1952 brought an end to their right to Japanese citizenship as they would have to give up their Korean citizenship to do so (Minority Rights Group, 2016). A Circular Notice was issued in 1952 which declared that Koreans were deprived of their Japanese nationality, and that they had to go through the same formalities as foreigners if they wanted to be naturalized in Japan (Tamura, 2003). This notice was embedded in the Registration Law in 1952, where foreigners were required to be fingerprinted and carry a certificate of alien registration (Tamura, 2003). This law provides the baseline that allows Japanese to treat Zainichi Koreans differently to Japanese citizens as it demonstrates that once Japanese colonial rule had ended, Koreans were no longer accepted as equals into their society, which sparked the concepts of Japanese as a superior ethnic group. In 1965 the Japan-South Korea treaty and the accord was signed which gave Koreans (only those with South Korean Nationality who had been in Japan before the war and their descendents) the legal status of permanent residents (Tamura, 2003). Minority Rights Group (2016) state that in the second half of the twentieth century, Koreans were not allowed to register their Korean family names which they may have previously lost through the Japanese governments forcing the adoption of Japanese sounding names during the colonial period. This demonstrates how only Japanese-like characteristics were accepted among Korean citizens, which further emphasises Weiner's (1996) claim surrounding the concept of 'Japaneseness' within their society. Many lawsuits have been filed by Koreans against the Japanese government, local autonomous bodies and business

enterprises that were once committed to using forced labour, for compensation for damages caused by nationality clauses or conscription during the colonial period (Tamura, 2003). The Koreans, however, are often unsuccessful in these attempts, which show the favouritism towards Japanese people and the view that Koreans are inferior.

The subordinate way in which Koreans were treated during the annexation period from 1910 to 1945 provided a baseline for the discriminatory and unfair views that have developed towards them over time. Japan aimed to integrate them into Japanese society as an underclass meaning that they were seen as inferior during this occupation period. Since the war ended these views remained the same and developed into discriminatory practices that are often seen in education, employment and social welfare programmes. For example, Koreans are often declined as employees, marriage proposals are turned down upon discovery that they are Korean, and they are excluded from health insurance, national pension programmes and unemployment benefits.

The discriminative processes of Korean education in Japan

“Minorities in Japan have been denied opportunities to embrace their cultural heritage and to develop their cultural identity” (Motani, 2012, pp.227). This statement relates to the fact that Koreans living in Japan face difficulties in receiving education that promotes their national identity, and their culture and language is often oppressed by the Japanese government (Motani, 2012). Berry (1997) cited in Motani (2012) argues that it is essential for Koreans to have links to their own culture to allow them to accumulate and adapt properly, and the failure of this diminishes these opportunities and places these cultural minorities at a disadvantage. Hester (2000) cited in Tai (2008, pp.7) found that both Korean and Japanese teachers see an “identification with a Korean heritage as key to positive self-image”, however, Japanese teachers stress the goal of eliminating stigma whilst Korean teachers see it as important in promoting national identity. Throughout this section I will discuss the history of Korean education in Japan and the factors in motion that discriminate young Koreans within an education system that is heavily centred towards Japanese culture.

Ethnic education for Korean children is displayed in Japanese public schools and Korean ethnic schools operated by Korean organisations (Tai, 2008). After the end of Japan’s colonial rule in 1945, the remaining Koreans living in Japan began to establish schools to restore their history and culture (Motani, 2012). Around 550 schools were created in a year accommodating 44,000 Korean students, and the development of The League of Koreans (*‘choren’*) in 1945 played a vast role in opening Korean ethnic schools due to their concerns around the number of young Koreans who were not fluent in the Korean language (Tai, 2008). The aim of Minzoku kyōiku (ethnic education) was to try to raise Korean national consensus among young Koreans (Tai, 2008). However, in 1948 the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) issued an order that all Korean children should attend Japanese schools, despite the fact that they would not receive equal treatment there (Tae Eun, 2006) (Motani, 2012). In 1949 the Japanese government ordered the dissolution of the League of Koreans as well as most of the 337 schools associated with it (Tai, 2008). These discriminative acts of the Japanese government led to anger within the Korean population, and demonstrations were held by tens of thousands of Koreans to protest against the governments closing order (Tae Eun, 2006). These protests, however, were often described as ‘riots’ within the Japanese media, which further emphasises the frequent claim that Koreans are responsible for the majority of crime within Japan. Former Tokyo governor Shintarō Ishihara added to this by making the comment that foreigners commit crime because they are foreigners; a type of claim that has become normalised within Japanese society (Arudou, 2015).

Within Japanese public schools, the guideline of ‘treating Korean children in the same way as Japanese children’ and teaching them to ‘live like Japanese’ is followed (Mukage, 2001 in Tai, 2008, pp. 8). Many Koreans did not agree with this guideline as they believed that it was an act by the Ministry of Education to suppress Korean culture, and was teaching them to abandon their national identity in favour of Japanese identity. Korean children were encouraged to use more Japanese-like names, and according to a report by the OHCHR (2005) only 14.2% of Korean children use their Korean name in primary schools. Motani (2012) argues that there are no policies put in place at regular schools for respecting the Korean language and culture, and therefore Korean schools allow them to reaffirm their cultural and historical heritage.

In the 1950's many Korean ethnic schools were re-opened and still exist today. Bilingual education is taught within these schools due to Japanese being the main language, and the curriculum involves Korean history, culture, language and geography, but not at the expense of teaching Japanese language (Motani, 2012). However, these schools struggle in Japanese society as they are not treated equally to public schools and other foreign schools. The Ministry of Education in Japan does not recognise Korean ethnic schools as regular schools, and are instead seen as 'miscellaneous' schools (Motani, 2012). This means that despite the high levels of teaching, those who graduate from these schools have fewer opportunities due to discrimination when seeking employment than those who attend regular Japanese schools. The Minority Rights Group (2016) claim that there was no movement from education authorities in Japan in 2005 and 2006 to establish state schools teaching in Korean despite criticisms since 1998 from UNESCO and UN committee on the Rights of the Child in 2004 on the limited opportunities for children to be educated in their own language. Korean ethnic schools do not receive financial support from the government, and families struggle to afford the tuition costs (OHCHR, 2005) (Tai, 2008). In 2003 the Japanese government made graduates from international and foreign schools eligible for the university entrance examinations but did not extend this to Korean schools, which means that Koreans are discouraged from attending Korean ethnic schools (Minority Rights Group, 2016). Japan also introduced the high school waiver programme in April 2010, but Korean schools that applied for recognition before the deadline did not receive a conclusion from the minister for more than 2 years (LAZAK, 2014). Donations to foreign schools in Japan are tax exempt, but not Koreans, which further emphasises the financial burden on these schools (Minority Rights Group, 2016). Motani (2012) argues that the ministry of education protects Japanese students attending regular schools abroad and do not expect these 'ethnic Japanese schools' to be denied as academic regular schools, and therefore it is inconsistent for them to deny Korean schools this. In the 1990's 'Periods for Integrated Studies' (PIS) was introduced, and policy began to include the promotion of international understanding education (Tae Eun, 2006). Ethnic classes were newly established in 45 schools compared to 14 schools in the 70's. A social welfare foundation known as 'Seikyusha' was established in 1973, which broadened activities for children at elementary and junior high schools such as childcare after schools, study support for Korean children, and places for children to stay and play together (Tae Eun, 2006). These developments demonstrate that the discrimination against Koreans in education has lessened since the 1940's, however; there are still developments that need to be made to ensure that Koreans receive equal education and therefore equal opportunities in terms of employment.

The rise of hate speech through the internet and activism

'Heito supīchi' (hate speech) is becoming an increasingly serious problem within Japan (Youngmi, 2015), and is being allowed to continue to flourish due to the lack of national legislation that outlaws racial discrimination (OHCHR, 2005). The rising levels of hate speech in Japan is conducted by Japanese nationals against Koreans living in Japan, who are commonly referred to as 'Zainichi Koreans' which comes from the Japanese word meaning 'staying in Japan' (Minority Rights, 2016). The hate speech and protests can also be against anything that is considered as 'pro-Korean', which is branded as 'anti-Japanese' (Youngmi, 2015).

According to The Diplomat (2014), a survey conducted by the Japanese government demonstrated that 66.4% of Japanese respondents do not have friendly feelings towards Koreans, and this has led to the anti-Korea movement that favour violent protests and hate speech as part of their ideology. These movements are largely based on conservative, right-wing ideologies who believe that leftist politicians have made Japan powerless to stand up to Korea and China (Fackler, 2012).

A common way that hate speech is projected throughout Japan is through the internet and online communication sources, and this is fuelled through the increasing progression in technology and social media. This has led to the development of ultranationalists in Japan known as 'Net Uyoku', a right-wing group of individuals who post xenophobic and racist comments online which are mainly aimed towards Japan's neighbouring East Asian nations (South Korea and China) who they believe to be harmful to Japan's national interest (Murai, 2012). Murai (2012) claims that these groups use a popular video-sharing communication website known as '*Nico Nico Douga*' to spread their ideology of an anti-Korean society. Political messages are posted in the politics category of the website to demonise Korea and China, and also to emphasise Conservative beliefs and widespread street

demonstrations. Murai (2012) argues that 92.8% of videos in the top 100 of this website contain the ideology of 'Net Uyoku', and only 2.65% of videos in the top 100 are criticising this radical racial stance towards ethnic minority groups. This demonstrates the impact that the Net Uyoku have on Japanese citizens, and this poses a problem for the number of young people who are likely to use this site and be influenced by the amount of hatred towards Korea and China and therefore develop these racist views themselves.

Net Uyoku are suspicious towards the Liberal Democrat political party and the media as they consider them to be anti-Japanese. Shibuichi and Daiki (2007) argue that the 'Uyoku Rōnin Dō', a right-wing activist group, support this ideology, and are known to demand to meet with members of the mass media who make what they deem to be 'inappropriate remarks' and insist on retractions and apologies. In August 2006, a radical burnt down Katō Kōichi's (a Liberal Democrat politician) home and stabbed himself in the stomach with a sword (Shibuichi and Daiki, 2007). This supports the claim that these ultranationalist groups are suspicious towards the mass media and Liberal Democrat party. The ideology of Net Uyoku is very similar to that of the activist group 'Zaitokukai' which is an abbreviation for 'Zainichi Tokken o Yurusanai Shimin no Kai' meaning the Citizens Association to Oppose the Special Rights for [Foreign] residents in Japan (Iwabuchi and Takezawa, 2015). The group was founded in 2007 by Makoto Sakurai, and oppose that Zainichi are given special privileges, such as the right to vote or to claim benefits, without Japanese citizenship (Vice, 2014). Zaitokukai are characterised by their loud demonstrations against Korean and Chinese communities that are widely reported in international and Japanese media, and their logo involves a black and red 'no-entry' sign with the word 'No!!' across it (Morris-Suzuki, 2015). Morris-Suzuki (2015) claims that the group targets Korean schools in Japan, areas with large Korean or Chinese areas, proposals to expand Japan's migrant intake, and policies to promote the culture of the Ainu people. Sakurai, the leader of Zaitokukai, claims that the group is established to protest against Korean residents in Japan who he believes to be 'parasiting' with unfair social aid given to them as compensation for World War II (Murai, 2012). He also claims that the Koreans are asking for too much compensation, and that the land needs to be given back to 'true' Japanese citizens (Murai, 2012). Morris-Suzuki (2015) supports this argument by stating that their ideology suggests that if the minority are getting more rights, the majority are getting less.

Zaitokukai's active campaigning against Koreans has resulted in many arrests and law suits against them (Youngmi, 2015). Iwabuchi and Takezawa (2015) claim that, in October 2013, the Kyoto District Court judged that the campaigning that Zaitokukai has been carrying out around the Kyoto Korean School constituted 'racial discrimination' as defined by the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) which they had ratified in 1995. Their propaganda was banned and they were forced to pay 12,260,000 yen in damages. However, Youngmi (2015) argue that this legal intervention does not deter Zaitokukai from their active protests and hate speech.

Zaitokukai claim that their activities should be as radical as possible in order to gain the attention of 'naive' citizens, to educate people on the truth and to 'wake citizens up from manipulation' (Murai, 2012). Fackler (2010) provides an example of one of the first protests that took place by the Zaitokukai. Demonstrators appeared outside an elementary school for ethnic Koreans at lunch and used bullhorns to call the children cockroaches and Korean spies. The children and teachers had to huddle in classrooms singing loudly to drown out all of the insults until police intervention arrived (Fackler, 2010). This demonstrates the dangers of the development of these activist groups, and suggests that Japan needs strong preventative legislation to stop the mislead ideology of Zaitokukai and Net Uyoku from having a negative impact on their lives from a young age. Murai (2012) believes that their ideology is based on the conspiracy theory that the Koreans and Chinese are trying to invade Japanese land and that 'anti-Japanese' authorities and mass media are supporting them in doing so.

Discrimination towards Japan's minority groups; the Ainu and Buraku

There are three minority groups within Japan that also experience discrimination from the Japanese; these groups are the Ainu, Buraku people, and the people of Okinawa (OHCHR, 2005). For the purposes of this research I am going to focus on the discrimination of the Ainu and Burakumin by highlighting significant historical events that have led to their marginalisation and whether their experiences have improved in Japan's current society.

The Ainu are an indigenous population who inhabit the island of Hokkaidō of Japan (Minority Rights Group, 2016). The Ainu have a distinct set of cultures and values which have largely disappeared today as a result of their strained history with the Japanese. From the 14th century, the Ainu began to feel pressure from the Japanese who were asserting power and control over Hokkaidō (Minority Rights Group, 2016). Siddle (2012) argues that the context in which the Ainu became a subordinated population was one of colonialism in Hokkaidō. Japan established dominance after the Meiji Restoration of 1868 when the Japanese state established a colonial order in the newly acquired territory of Hokkaidō (Siddle, 2012). The direct administration by the Japanese government over Ainu land and people led to the legal extinguishment of Ainu land and a programme to encourage the Japanese to settle in Hokkaidō, which resulted in a huge population boost with the Ainu living among foreign settlers (Minority Rights Group, 2016). During the Meiji period, legislation banned the use of the Ainu language in schools and prohibited cultural practices, including traditional fishing and hunting (Minority Rights Group, 2016). Modernisation, mass immigration and capitalist development in Hokkaidō drastically altered the lives of the Ainu, and they became a ‘radicalised’ population (Siddle, 2012). Siddle (2012) argues that Japan’s colonisation of Hokkaidō can be seen as the natural propensity for ‘superior races’ (Japan) to conquer and rule ‘inferior’ ones (Ainu are perceived as the inferior subordinated population).

The establishment of a colonial order in Hokkaidō led to the inferiority of the Ainu people, and a view was constructed of them as ‘savages’ or primitively and racially immature (Weiner, 1996). At the National History museum in Sapporo, life size waxwork reproductions depict the Japanese ‘exploration’ of Hokkaidō in 1870, and the island is presented as unused and unappreciated by the previous inhabitants (Weiner, 1996). In 1912, Nitobe Inazo described them as ‘hairy Ainu’ (*mōjin*), a stone age population that belongs to the prehistoric age and is doomed to extinction, and Basil Hall Chamberlain argued that they have not benefited from the opportunities given to them and that there is no room left for them in the world (Weiner, 1996). Siddle (2012) argues that the Ainu are challenging the official histories of the coloniser with counter-narratives that provide them with a coherent past and a memory that helps mediate their struggles. In the 1980’s, Ainu activists became a part of a global network of indigenous organisations that hold the belief that ‘people’ should determine its own political institutions within an ancestral territory (Siddle, 2012).

In 1997 a law was introduced to promote the Ainu language and culture (OHCHR, 2005). A Foundation for Research and Promotion of Ainu Culture was founded which have financial support for classes to teach the Ainu language, however, this was not a part of the school curriculum (Minority Rights Group, 2016). The Ministry of Social Welfare, Health and Employment provided financial support to the Ainu and promoted their recruitment (OHCHR, 2005). This shows that discrimination against the Ainu has improved since the Meiji period; however, discrimination still exists today. According to an OHCHR report (2005), many Ainu people conceal their identity in order to avoid discrimination in education, employment, welfare services and everyday life. Discrimination is found to be very strong within schools for Ainu children, which means that they are still not treated as equal among the Japanese. Many children drop out as a result of this, which can have a serious negative impact on their futures (OHCHR, 2005). Children become ashamed of their identity because of this, which leads to the increased number of Ainu people hiding their identities which further decreases the practice of Ainu culture (OHCHR, 2005). The Special Rapporteur of the OHCHR report (2005) reported that the Japanese need to better understand the history of the Ainu in order to stop the portrayal of them as inferior and to challenge the prejudices of them as ‘barbaric’ and unintelligent, which have been built by the Japanese to justify the historical oppression of the Ainu.

The Burakumin are a social category or caste who share the same language, religion, customs and physical appearances as the Japanese (Minority Rights Group, 2016). They are descendents of outcast communities from the feudal era who were generally located in poorer areas and associated with poor jobs. The Buraku were ruled by laws and customs which regulated their status and restricted where they lived and what type of work they engaged in (Minority Rights Group, 2016). This caste system was abolished in 1871 and the Buraku people were granted equal status before the law, however, this did not stop the discrimination against them as the Japanese did not want to be ‘polluted’ by them (Minority Rights Group, 2016). A law was introduced in 1969 (‘Law on Special Measures for Dowa Projects’) that aimed to eliminate discrimination against the Burakumin. This law improved living

standards by addressing poor housing and access to education and employment (OHCHR, 2005). This law was terminated in 2002 when it was believed that the situation had improved (OHCHR, 2005). In 2000 the Osaka prefectural government conducted a study on the situation of Buraku people and found that not much had changed in the way of education and employment or the way in which they are viewed by the Japanese. 20% of Japanese did not want to marry a Buraku person, and 40% did not want to live in a Buraku area (OHCHR, 2005). In 1985 some Japanese governments took steps to prevent the use of 'Buraku lists' and private investigations into an individual's background to determine whether or not they are Burakumin (Minority Rights Group, 2016). However, there is not a national law to stop this or to prevent discrimination against Burakumin, and in Tokyo a number of companies still use Buraku lists (OHCHR, 2005). Neary (1996) argues that the Buraku's situation has improved over the past 50 years; discrimination is no longer as blatant and communities have improved, however, some would argue that it has taken on less obvious forms. The rise in internet technology has create problems for them as it has resulted in an increase in derogatory and discriminatory messages against them, and they still experience problems with health, disabilities and education (Minority Rights Group, 2016) (OHCHR, 2005).

Conclusion

In conclusion, racism and xenophobia exists in Japan towards Koreans, foreigners, the Ainu, Burakumin and the people of Okinawa. Throughout this research the discrimination towards Zainichi Koreans has been especially highlighted. This prejudice began in the Japanese colonial period of Korea during 1910 to 1945, and the processes that occurred during this period provided a baseline for the way in which Koreans living in Japan are treated today. Koreans are largely seen as an inferior race to the Japanese which has had a negative effect on opportunities such as education and employment. Koreans experience subordination in education as they do not receive the same respect when attending Korean ethnic schools, however, if they choose to attend Japanese public schools their use of the Korean language and culture is oppressed. Due to the rise in internet technology, Koreans have also become the target of online hate abuse. The key example of this is the rise of 'Net Uyoku' which is used to post demeaning and abusive messages towards Koreans. The activist group 'Zaitokukai' has also developed hatred towards Koreans which is spurred on due to the lack of legislation that prohibits this racial discrimination.

A theory that can be applied to racism in Japan is the Critical Race Theory. This theory sees racism as a study of power relations in society, particularly how people are rendered into hierarchal categories of power, social dominance and wealth acquisition (Arudou, 2013). This theory is interesting to apply to racism in Japan as it is usually associated with America; however, it has been expanded to study post-colonialism and power structures in other societies (Arudou, 2013). In the case of Japan, anybody who holds Japanese qualities or is 'pure' Japanese is the population placed at the top of the hierarchy and seen as the ones with the power to discriminate. Those who do not hold these qualities are seen as subordinate. The Burakumin are an example of this as they are placed at the bottom of the caste-like system and are looked upon with disdain due to this stigma.

Racism is embedded in Japan through its power structures to the point where the disenfranchisement of minorities are what make Japanese society work (Arudou, 2013). Discourses of Japanese homogeneity are a result of this, and the radicalised legalisation of this discourse has made Japan unable to protect Japanese society from racial discrimination (Arudou, 2013). This means that Japan portrays the illusion of homogeneity and the racial discrimination becomes embedded and normalised within Japanese society. Any people that fall into the 'non-Japanese' category are made to feel self-conscious about being 'different' with insufficient legal protection from unequal treatment (Arudou, 2013).

Racism against minority groups in Japan is improving; however, it still largely exists as a problem in need of an immediate solution. Many believe that Japan need to recognise its racism problem before it can begin to tackle the problem. The Critical Race Theory proves that racism is not just a problem associated with western countries, and the existence of racism in Japan suggests that more knowledge and understanding needs to be given to racism around the world.

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