

CERS Working Paper, 2012.

Why a non-black identity – the Lebanese – as part of Nigeria’s national polity has been problematic

“A number one target”

Introduction

‘For Mohammad Obeid, a Lebanese from Tripoli¹ who lives in the central Nigerian city of Abuja, the situation is deeply worrisome. [...] “For me I will be leaving this country if this violence turns to a civil war. In this situation *we will be a number one target for kidnapppers and armed thugs,*” he adds’ (Dockery, 2012, *emphasis added*).²

A 52-year-old man is found dead, lying in a pool of his own blood at his residence. A knife, the ID card of his girlfriend and a syringe are recovered at the scene (Akinkuotu, 2012). Two months later, a man carrying 50,000 US dollars is stabbed to death in a hotel room. Knocked to the ground by blunt force to the head, he is repeatedly stabbed in the head, eyes, neck and shoulder (Ezeobi, 2012). A week later, gunmen attack a vehicle carrying staff from a local construction company working on a water project. One construction worker is killed, another kidnapped (Reuters, 2012; France24, 2012).

Three lives, three deaths, three stories that perhaps present an ambiguous resonance to the reader who may have come across similar, unfortunate headlines in any country in the world, maybe stories of fellow citizens, never met, whose lives ended in tragedy.

Habib Haschem was found in his flat in Apapa³, police suspecting his murderer to be his girlfriend Precious Tochukwu. Haschem was of Lebanese origin, Precious Nigerian. Alli Sani, a money exchange operator, was requested on the morning of his murder by a Bilal⁴ to bring 50,000 dollars to his hotel room in Lagos⁵ so he could exchange it for Naira⁶. Alli was Nigerian, the man who killed him, Bilal, is Lebanese. The attack in the northern state of Kaduna is indicative of how kidnapping has become big business in Nigeria and how Lebanese, like the two construction workers, are popular targets (Daily Star, 2012).

These tragic stories provide a sadly ironic glimpse of an established Lebanese presence in Nigeria, one dating back to the 1800s (Falola, 1990: 525). They illustrate the history of different generations of Lebanese who have lived (perhaps born), loved, killed, were killed, how this social group now comprising 20,000⁷ individuals has become a part of Nigeria’s ethnoscape⁸ and has made Nigeria home, in varying degrees.

The presence of Lebanese in West Africa has always been met with public indignation, but unlike the experiences of Lebanese in countries like Ghana and Sierra Leone, the Lebanese in Nigeria have been spared physical violence against their collective community (Misra, 1992: 565). Still, acts of political and economic oppression against them in various phases in Nigeria’s history may have taught them to keep out of politics and ultimately have placed them as an indifferent, foreign, non-black presence in a black space.

This paper attempts to look at why a non-black identity as part of Nigeria’s national identity has been problematic, with the Lebanese as its case study. To develop and support each point, this essay shall look at how Africa has been constructed as the Dark Continent through colonialist constructs; further constructed as a static, romanticized black space by “Pan-Melanism”

(Langley, 1965: 165) ideologies and ideologists such as Edward Blyden and Marcus Garvey; and reinforced as a black space by nationalist movements.

It shall briefly look at the history of Lebanese migration to West Africa and specifically their history in Nigeria; their economic and social interactions with Nigerians; how they were racialized⁹ and how they racialized; and how they were at various instances discriminated against through laws and practices that targeted and restricted their business activities. It shall also look at nationalistic movements in Nigeria, going over periods in the country's history concerning indigenization requirements, denied naturalizations of Lebanese, and the association of "indigeneity" with "race" and nation.

"I am black, but o! my soul is white"¹⁰

The darkening of Africa

"All of you brothers over in Africa / Tell all the folks in Egypt, and Israel, too¹¹ / Please don't miss this train at the station / 'Cause if you miss it, I feel sorry, sorry for you" (The O'Jays, "Love Train", *emphasis added*).

The African continent is largely represented by "Africa South of the Sahara" (Anise, 1974: 27), imagery that usually conjures up racial connotations of blackness. Indeed, an obscure, uniform blackness is almost always associated with Africa, the Dark Continent, a metaphor that "homogenizes and flattens places and people and denies the actualities and specificities" of its diversity (Jarosz, 1992: 105).

This fixed identity is problematic given the constant migration within and across geographical spaces in Africa; the Arabs and Berbers in its northern region; descendants of European settlers in the south; its population of African Asians; its Khoisan peoples; and just its general intricate ethnic tapestry when you look at countries like Madagascar with its Austronesian heritage (Anise, 1974: 27, 28; Baker, 2001; Vérin and Wright, no year):

"[...] Africa, despite her racial mixture, has generally been identified exclusively with black people. The socially operative definition of Africa, in other words, is racially determined and inexorably linked with the black man. Indeed, the assertion that Africa belongs to Africans means in all simplicity that Africa belongs to its black population" (Anise, 1974: 28).

Historical constructions of this "Dark Continent" filled with savage, "cruel and despotic men" are said to have originated from, and were indeed most prominent during, "the imperialist partitioning of Africa" (Brantlinger, 1985: 166; Van der Laan, 1992: 537). Indeed, this image of darkness is a legacy of colonial institutions that tended "to organize and transform non-European areas into fundamentally European constructs", through "binary oppositions which contrasted the virtues of European civilization with their supposed absence from Africa" (Mudimbe, 1988: 1, 64):

'Africa grew "dark" as Victorian explorers, missionaries, and scientists flooded it with light, because the light was refracted through an imperialist ideology that urged the abolition of "savage customs" in the name of civilization' (Brantlinger, 1985: 166).

A mythical black continent was re-produced, re-presented and reinforced largely through: colonists and colonialists constructs; missionary objectives and missioned ideologies; a

“narrative fascination” with Africa (Ibid: 175); and early anthropological searches for primitiveness and the exotic other; all combined with selectively ignoring positivist orientations and the overall impact of the subjective “re”¹² (Mudimbe, 1988; Brantlinger, 1985; Davies, 1999: 10-13; Jarosz, 1992).

Missionary activities in Africa played a large part in constructing it as a savage blackness in need of the salvation and light of Christianity. Christianity had already attained a distinctive badge of whiteness for most of its history, having become the religion of Europe (Dyer, 1997: 17). And, through colonization, it became Europe’s main export, and missionary objectives¹³ had to be co-extensive with the colonizer’s political and cultural perspectives on colonization (Brantlinger, 1985: 178). Missionary objectives created a framework of dualism that utilized metaphors of darkness to mean sin, non-Christian beliefs and ignorance, and lightness to conceptualize “the Light of Christian doctrine and epistemology” (Jarosz, 1992: 107).

By ignoring the impact of subjectivities on research, the traditionalist approach to anthropological study contributed to the darkening of Africa, and “its complicity in colonialism” was instrumental in providing projected preconceptions and imaginings of a black space:

“[...] classical ethnographic research was not simply presenting a distorted view of native societies and culture, but that it was not seeing them at all, that in fact these ethnographies were primarily reflections of the preconceptions of ethnographers based on their own disciplinary and Western cultural expectations” (Davies, 1999: 13).

Through sociolinguistic processes, anthropologists, missionaries, travellers, writers and the like, all produced knowledge of Africa that became its factual history. This knowledge was built not only through a cognitive process but by the outcomes of these processes (Gergen and Gergen, 1991: 77-79). It is through “the linguistic implications of preferred positions” that the constructed darkness of Africa was generated, a discourse where the voices of the dominated was “represented almost entirely by their silence” (Brantlinger, 1985: 167).

So, as shown, Africa was constructed as a black space through imperialist discourse¹⁴ that was inevitably racist (Ibid: 181-182). Its darkness was an invention “shaped by political and economic pressures and also by psychology of blaming the victim through which Europeans projected many of their own darkest impulses” (Ibid: 198). The history of the Dark Continent ‘is fundamentally a myth and thus enlarge Levi-Strauss’s concerns: “history is never history, but history for”’ (Mudimbe, 1988: 33).

The next section shall diverge slightly from the constructions of a black Africa to introduce the presence of a non-black identity into a black space – the arrival of the Lebanese in Nigeria.

“Too visible to be ignored” The Lebanese arrive

The first recorded presence¹⁵ of Lebanese in West Africa is said to be in Sierra Leone in the 1880s, while oral sources speculate it at around 1888 in Conakry (Khuri, 1968: 91) and between 1860 and 1876 in Dakar (Boumedouha, 1992: 550; Akyeampong, 2006: 305). In Nigeria, there is conclusive evidence of their presence in 1890 (Misra, 1992: 565). What is certain is by the twentieth century the Lebanese community had grown and become established in varying ways¹⁶ in many of West Africa’s biggest cities¹⁷.

Throughout West Africa, the Lebanese have largely been seen as a single homogeneous group. In Nigeria, as other parts of the region, they have been racialized throughout their history as unscrupulous traders and an exploitive community, and their earlier migrations were seen as sponsored and encouraged by the colonial administration (Falola, 1990: 525).

“A whole string of derogatory clichés has become attached to [the Lebanese identity]” (Bigo, 1992: 509). Perceived as a problematic foreign group residing in Nigeria and, generations on from their first arrival, are still not seen as part of the Nigerian polity, they at times find themselves as “an ideal scapegoat” in times of “economic crisis and prevailing uncertainty over the future” (Ibid: 510).

As this section will show, the dealings and perceived “nature” of the Lebanese may have been exaggerated and resulted in a time when attacks on any perceived “foreign control of the economy included both concern of the control by the West and the need to reduce the impact of groups like the Lebanese” (Falola, 1990: 523). This section shall present a brief overview of the history of Lebanese in Nigeria, the interactions that took place between the then new immigrants and their Nigerian hosts, and the racializations of both groups that sprung out of these interactions.

As mentioned earlier, the colonial constructions of Africa as “the antithesis of Europe and therefore of civilization” (Achebe, 1977: 783), provided moral fodder for colonial rule. These were further exaggerated with regards to Africa’s interior and it is perhaps because of this myth that, in the early 1900s, the Lebanese were “reluctant to participate in the commercial participation of the interior”, leading to too high a concentration of them in certain coastal towns “in relation to the commercial opportunities available” (Van der Laan, 1992: 537).

In their early years in Nigeria, “Lebanese commercial activities were not too significant” and they supplemented themselves with street singing and musical performances (Falola, 1990: 529). However, they were determined workers who would “walk to villages where there was just subsistence in order to start trade” (Van der Laan, 1992: 547), and in cities like Maiduguri¹⁸ they would jostle “alongside low-tech con men and pickpockets - all hoping to get a slice of the bulging sacks of money freely freighted around on wheelbarrows” (Saleh, 2012).

By the 1930s, “Lebanese presence and impact had become too visible to be ignored” (Falola, 1990: 529). They began to employ new business tactics: They used low prices to outmanoeuvre local competition; “created new consumer tastes by diversifying the goods on sale in the interior” (Akyeampong, 2006: 308); and took on the role of middlemen (Falola, 1990: 530), a role that clinched the image of Lebanese as “an appendage to colonization”, exposing them as “targets of indigenous west African hostility” (Bigo, 1992: 509; Akyeampong, 2006: 308).

An ability to respond faster than Nigerian traders to changes in the colonial era; the utilization of tactics of high mobility; a willingness “to settle in new locations with uncertain prospects of success and when no trade developed they abandoned the place and optimistically tried somewhere else” (Van der Laan, 1992: 547); and a quickness in catering to the interests of the elite and emerging middle class (Falola, 1990: 526) perhaps gave more cause to growing resentment against them.

During their early years, their business tactics coupled with their saturated presence versus limited available commercial opportunities may have contributed to “feelings of frustration and annoyance among” local traders in these cities and contributed to what would become persistent anti-Lebanese sentiments throughout the region (Van der Laan, 1992: 537). It is

within these early interactions that certain racializations began to build up between Lebanese and Nigerians.

“Grabbing and acquisitive” Themes of racializations

As they settled into Nigeria, the “Lebanese had to grapple with competition and severe criticisms against them as individuals, as a race, and as traders” (Falola, 1990: 538). Perhaps as a result of their successful economic activities; their presence as competitors to not just Nigerians but Europeans as well; their tendency to engage in “utilitarian familialism” (Ong et al, 1996: 748); their overstated association with the colonial presence; and possibly because they were the accessible group to target frustrations at European colonizers (Akyeampong, 2006: 300), certain racializations began to manifest.

Three common themes of racialization regarding Lebanese in the region were and still are: “the ravishers of women”; the racists; and the ones who engage in dishonest, exploitive economic activities (Kaniki, 1973; Falola, 1990; Van der Laan, 1965; Khuri, 1968; Misra, 1992; Beuving, 2006).

The first theme developed through unhampered interactions of Lebanese men with African women coupled with their resistance to Lebanese women getting involved with African men (Bierwirth, 1999: 95). With regards to the latter, Lebanese men were further racialized through a widespread myth that they saved their daughters for themselves, “a ‘well-known fact’ that every Lebanese woman has her first sexual experience with her father” (Ibid: 98).

This reputation of bedding but not marrying indeed existed in Nigeria, where “the Lebanese avoided marriages with Nigerians and some groups among them preferred to marry their cousins” (Falola, 1990: 533-534). Furthermore, although it was noted that Lebanese men of the interior perhaps frequently marry local women, they did so largely to solidify their position in the chiefdom and pensioned off their African wives as soon as they made enough money to bring a wife from Lebanon (Leighton, 1992: 582).

“Unrestrained by any community pressure, adult males, living alone in Africa, have felt free to exploit their sexual desires” (Khuri, 1968: 93). Beuving (2006) further illustrates this through his conversation with a young Lebanese man in Cotonou¹⁹:

“‘In Lebanon, you cannot talk just like that to any girl,’ a young Lebanese once explained to me; ‘you’ll need an introduction, first you talk to her brothers, and father, and maybe then you’ll get to go out with her.’” (2006: 347).

The second theme in the racialization of Lebanese is their suspected racism. This partly stems from the first one, “the ravishers of women”:

“The Senegalese charge the Lebanese with being racist in not marrying their women to Senegalese men. The Lebanese respond by adamantly stating [...] ‘integration is not done below your belt’” (Leichtman, 2005: 669).

Although the charge of racism based on the non-marriage of African women²⁰ might have been exaggerated as there is evidence of Lebanese intermarrying (Lee, 2009; Rousseau, 2011: 24), one can understand the objections to their interactions with African women:

“[...] the worst of it is the attitude of young Lebanese men towards native women whom they pursue while tending to despise them [...] By entering into sexual contact with Ivorian women while refusing most of the time to marry them—and at all times to allow their women to engage with Ivorian men” (Bigo, 1992, 523).

Lebanese have defended this infrequent engagement in intermarriage, insisting it has nothing to do with racism and more so with certain other factors. One main reason given is the practice of utilitarian familialism²¹. The Lebanese, drawing from strategies and resources developed in Lebanon, practiced utilitarian familialism in order to reproduce family businesses and keep overhead costs at a minimum, and this is certainly part of why they have been successful in their economic activities.

By marrying people of the same religious denomination and from the same place of origin, they seemed to have been engaged in the reproduction of Lebanese kinship structures²² and ethnic boundary building that have been firmly established in Lebanon (Khuri, 1965; Jamali and Keshishian, 2008: 282; Ajrouch and Kusow, 2007: 79; Hanf, 1993: 327). In addition, “marrying only Lebanese and trying to reproduce family businesses reinforced the perception of this community as separate and aloof” and racist (Akyeampong, 2006: 300).

In the region, accusations of the racism of Lebanese not connected to their interactions with African women also existed:

“[...] it was alleged, and no doubt believed, that the Lebanese boasted of enjoying a higher place in Government circles than the Sierra Leoneans. They were accused of having called the Creoles "niggers" and "slaves".⁵⁶ These insensible accusations were, however, not substantiated” (Kaniki, 1973: 104)²³.

This is not to say suspicions of racism or at the least racializations by Lebanese in Nigeria were unfounded²⁴. However, whether racist views were expressed explicitly and abundantly is debatable, as there seems to be little documentation and substantiation.

The third theme regarding questionable economic activities of the Lebanese shall concentrate on Nigeria. However, before going into the interactions between Nigerians and Lebanese traders and how these led to the racialized image of “exploiters who drained the country” (Misra, 1992: 566), let us take a brief look at the politics of trade and competition that took place with regards to the Lebanese in Nigeria at the beginning of the 20th century.

It should be noted that the Lebanese faced competition on four levels. Firstly, they faced discriminatory government policies and restrictions that targeted their businesses²⁵, and, at the same time, avoided confrontations with the government concerning policies directed against them (Falola, 1990: 538).

Secondly, there was competition amongst themselves, because Lebanese have always been strongly “divided by religion and sub-ethnic identities”, as well as political lines, attributes that contradict the widely held portrayal by Nigerians of Lebanese as a homogenous, unified group (Ibid: 526, 538).

Their third level of competition was European traders²⁶, who “joined in the campaign of calumny against the Lebanese and condemned their business ethics and life style” (Ibid: 539). In Nigeria, the “resentment of the Lebanese by the European firms came into the open in the 1930s, when

some Lebanese traders had shown their ability to move beyond retail” and respond to changes “at very short notice because the organization was flexible” (Ibid: 535, 539).

In addition, Lebanese along with Nigerians were ‘middlemen’²⁷ and ‘moneylenders’, and this image of middleman²⁸ was constructed by the European influence “as a source of 'abuse' and 'disorder' in marketing and as an exploiter of the peasant producer” (Williams, 1985: 11). Indeed, it has been noted that certain policies were put into place by the British government to exploit colonial producers “to shore up the crumbling defences of sterling and the imperial economy” and, to justify policies to eliminate the middleman, argued that producers would benefit from a regulated system and be protected from the abuses of middlemen (Williams, 1985).

The fourth level of competition was with Nigerian traders, and it is within this interaction the racialization of Lebanese as “grabbing and acquisitive” people (Akintola as quoted in Misra, 1992: 566) developed in its fullest, becoming a staple in their description (Falola, 1990; Misra, 1992).

“In places where they were denied admission in the 1930s, the Lebanese did not relent in their efforts to seek the means to change the decision”. In addition, their business practices involved avoiding permanent settlements in places not deemed lucrative and, instead, they operated out of lorries or used agents, and those without “lorries used the railways, hired lorries or walked”. These practices expedited their business growth, as well as the animosity towards them (Falola, 1990: 527, 530, 533).

Public opinion on their presence in Nigeria has always been divided²⁹. Critics such as Chief S. L. Akintola³⁰ have accused them of having a stranglehold on the country’s economy, and practicing economic activities that were deliberately detrimental to local businesses (Misra, 1992: 566). On the other hand, there are others³¹ who felt views like Akintola’s were baseless, and who recognize the Lebanese presence as a positive contribution³² and their business practices worthy of emulation (Misra, 1992: 566; Falola, 1990: 529).

Whatever the reaction was to their presence, by 1955 it was negative enough to become a heated subject at the Nigerian House of Representatives, where the purported unscrupulous business practices of the Lebanese were debated (Misra, 1992: 567). However, it has been noted that:

“Although it is true that the Lebanese were partly responsible for the displacement of some indigenous traders, it should be borne in mind that there were other factors equally responsible [...] for example the activities of European combines; the lack of capital and business acumen among the local traders; and to a greater degree the lack of credit worthiness among Nigerian traders.⁵⁸ Thus the blame for the elimination of indigenous traders does not solely rest with the Lebanese” (Ibid: 577).

And on this note, the next section commences, building on the earlier discussion of a constructed black Africa for only black people.

“He felt his colour”

Why Pan-Africa is black Africa

“At question time, a Zimbabwean member of the audience raised his hand [...] “I wish to ask a question to my African brother.” I replied, “which one?” This triggered a lengthy argument over whether a white South African was indeed, an African –much of it initiated by my co-panelist who assured me that, as a *white South African, I would always be a compatriot, but never an African*” (Friedman, 2004: 30, *emphasis added*).

The general air of distrust and racializations surrounding the Lebanese community in Nigeria were enough to cast this group as undesirable to the country. And, as we have seen, a lot of it stemmed from the reclamation of economic space from what was perceived as a non-black alien group. However, this paper argues that a struggle for limited resources alone did not warrant the rejection of Lebanese as part of the nation’s ethnoscape and identity, as “poverty can only account for the powerlessness, frustration and desperation of the perpetrators, but not for their target” (Neocosmos, 2008: 586).

One more factor possibly came into play with the placement of Lebanese as unwanted and alien: the concept of Nigeria as a black space for black people, hammered down through colonialism and then, as this section will present, perpetuated by Pan-African ideologies, and through the struggle for an independent nation and dignified national identity³³ free from any perceived opposing and intrusive foreign presence.

We start with the further blackening of Africa by Pan-Africanist ideologies. The great Pan-Africanist movements of the Americans and the Caribbean did much to challenge and elevate the image of black people around the globe. However, critics of these movements highlight “the dilemma posed by the black American ‘double consciousness’” and how these ideologies fell into a somewhat similar pattern as colonialists, constructing Africa as a romantic illusion, a static black space, a fixed place of origin (Langley, 1969: 166).

It should be noted that “some of the major features of the present-day African nationalist ideology were evolved by Africans” but it should also be acknowledged that “a major contribution to the formulation of the concepts of early African nationalism was made by Edward Wilmot Blyden” and other Black Atlantic ideologists such as Marcus Garvey (Frenkel, 1974: 277).

Blyden, along with great thinkers like W.E.B. Du Bois and Frantz Fanon, contributed to the social and political construction of blackness (Law, 2010: 15). Indeed, Blyden is known as the father of Pan-Africanism and the father of West African nationalism (Ibid: 17). Blyden rejected the notion of the inferiority of Africans, of black people, and “covered many aspects of African nationalism such as the common destiny of the Negro peoples, the distinctive mentality of the African [...] and the concept for ‘Africa for Africans’” (Frenkel, 1974: 277).

However, while rejecting the essence of anthropological theories endorsing the inferiority of the black human, Blyden endorsed their views on the necessity “to preserve the biological purity of each race through its physical segregation from other races” (Frenkel, 1974: 279; Falola, 2001: 39).

It is this “Africa for Africans” and segregation of races that perhaps understandably became the refrain of West African nationalistic movements including Nigeria’s, a purist ideology that led to rejecting a non-black presence in its polity. This idea of nation and nationality tied to race is one undeniably advocated by Blyden (Falola, 2001: 36).

Indeed, Blyden had a life-long, “violent dislike” for mixing between races, and “used the theory of preserving racial purity to justify his critical attitude to mulattos”, regarding them “as people with mixed and degenerative racial instincts—weak-willed and immoral” (Frenkel, 1974: 279, 280). Whatever the nature of his views were on non-black identities in black spaces, it can be said that Blyden had some influence on the formation of West African identities such as Nigeria’s (Okonkwo, 1980: 109).

If Blyden awakened sentiments of racial pride and unity that welcomed in the nationalist movements of West Africa, it was arguably in Marcus Garvey³⁴ that these philosophies of racial nationalism reached their culmination (Ibid: 105). Garvey went past cultural, non-political nationalism and called for the freeing of Africa from colonial rule and, like Blyden, advocated for the spirit of race unity (Ibid: 106).

In Nigeria, there was the presence of a strong Garvey movement with nationalist intelligentsia³⁵ “who had studied Garveyism closely and had related it to nationalistic politics” (Langley, 1969: 164). It is debatable the extent Garvey had on the political aspects of Nigerian nationalism. However, he seemed to have had enough to warrant worry within the colonial administration³⁶ (Ibid: 160).

If not regarding its political aspects, Garveyism did have a convincing impact on an economic plane, with strong support regarding “the industrial and economic aspects of Garveyism” (Ibid: 167). Garvey’s programme held philosophies of economic self-help and he “put great emphasis on projects for black-owned business and industry” (Okonkwo, 1980: 106).

Indeed, West African nationalists such as Kobina Sekyi, while calling for the rejection of the political pretensions of Garveyism, also stated that “[w]e have little or nothing to learn from West Indian or American political institutions; but we have very much to learn from their industrial or economic organisations” (Langley, 1969: 167).

Certainly, there were groups who were hostile to the pan-melanism ideologies of Garveyism and its tendency to be “wrapped up in oratorical setting and persistent appeal to the emotions of the American Negroes” (Ibid: 161). But Garvey’s impact and the inspiration he provided to nationalistic movements in the region cannot be ignored. By insisting on an idea of economic pride tied to one’s constructed race, “the commercial aspect of Garvey’s Pan-Negroism, especially the project of the Black Star Line” inspired the fight of a Nigeria for Nigerians.

Men like Blyden and Garvey did have a lasting impact on the region and inspired to certain extents the politicization of nationalistic movements such as Nigeria’s. Theirs “is a root fact of African politics: colour race” (Cary as quoted Langley, 1969: 170). And as one district officer serving in Nigeria³⁷ observed regarding Musa, his Hausa³⁸ political agent: “He had not expected to hear of black men owning and driving ocean-going ships, and he was deeply moved. He felt his colour” (Ibid).

“The concept of authenticity”

The colour of nationalism

“One of the early tasks of independent governments has been to define citizenship. Nationality can be defined by jus sanguinis (law of the blood) or by jus soli (law of the soil) [...] In Europe and America, nationality is territorially based [...] In Africa, tribal origin is more important. [...] The Ghana Government has been urged to deny

naturalisation to all Lebanese. *How could they become Ghanaians, it is asked, when they are white and Ghanaians are black?*" (Peil, 1971: 213-214, *emphasis added*).

Mamdani (2005) explains that the development of a culture of entitlement has led to an association of cultural identity as a basis for political identity and this "inevitably turns ethnicity into a political identity" (Ibid: 13). It has been noted as well that there is a tendency to use continental identities to refer to "racial" categories (Friedman, 2004: 30), a practice that possibly reinforces the socially constructed concept of race and ties it to origin and indigeneity.

Nations such as Nigeria coming out of colonialism felt the "need to express themselves. But what exactly is 'self'? For the nationalist, the only answer is to be found in the concept of *authenticity*" (Smith, 2001: 29). This paper argues that the notion that a nation must only concede to having its authentic, indigenous people as part of its national identity cannot be fully justified, is perhaps problematic, and that "Africans have been [...] consistent victims of this sort of thinking" (Friedman, 2004: 33).

Nigerian nationalism placed emphasis on the idea of being indigenous and autochthonous³⁹. Indeed, assertions of a Nigeria for Nigerians were particularly strong during periods of nationalistic sentiments. 'Nationalism was a struggle of natives to be recognized as a transethnic identity, as a race, as "Africans," and thus—as a race—to gain admission to the world of rights, to civil society, which was a short form for civilized society' (Mamdani, 2005: 4).

This kind of mainstream nationalist struggle is understandable and attempted to "reproduce the customary as the authentic tradition of Africa" but ultimately involved the reproduction of the dual legacy of colonialism (Ibid: 9), binary oppositions of blacks versus non-black, which perhaps resulted in no space for non-black identities in a polity conceptualized and defined as black.

This section concludes by suggesting that the conceptualization of a Nigeria polity perhaps also brought with it a number of burning questions such as: What is "Nigerian"? Who is an authentic Nigerian? How far back is "indigeneity" being traced? Should blackness be the foremost goal to pursue in attaining the ideal of a nation? And who then decides all these factors?

"Coerced national integration"

The creation of a nation

"Though tribe and tongue may differ/In brotherhood we stand/Nigerians all"

- This verse is taken from the former 1960 Nigerian National Anthem (Kirk-Greene, 1988: 165).

There were prominent figures and themes within Nigeria's nationalistic movements that were influential in the formation of the nation. This section shall present in brief Nigeria's political struggles in the mid-twentieth century, when calls for nationalistic sentiments were made and failed, but still influenced the country's political and economic struggles in many ways. It shall then present how the Lebanese were placed within these struggles for nation and national identity.

As mentioned earlier, nationalistic movements in West Africa were inspired in varying degrees by Pan-African ideologies. In Nigeria, there were influential men with Pan-Africanist influences⁴⁰

who pioneered these movements such as Herbert Macaulay⁴¹ (Falola, 2001: 101); and Nnamdi Azikiwe⁴².

However, nationalistic sentiments founded on Pan-Africanism found difficulty in thriving and the struggle for “a common national identity in Nigeria was a plant of slow growth”, with one reason being “the cultural diversity of a country of more than 250 ethnic groups”⁴³ (Tamuno, 1993: 196).

The early 1950s were a time of new constitutional arrangements and party political rivalries which sparked off separatist agitations in several parts of Nigeria. By 1953, Northern Members of Parliament demanded self-government, and by 1954 the principle of federalism was adopted. In 1960, Nigeria gained independence from British colonial rule (Nayar, 1975: 322).

Nigeria’s unity was threatened again following the 1963 census⁴⁴, and in 1964 the Tiv people of the Middle-Belt also sought secession. In 1966, there were two military coup d’etats, and both the creation and abolishment of the Unification Decree. Within all this was the Biafran War⁴⁵, which collapsed in 1970 (Tamuno, 1993: 199, 200, 203, 206, 207-210, 214; Kirk-Greene, 1988: 159).

By the 1970s, the result of years of political strife was “a coerced national integration and imposed national identity”⁴⁶ (Kirk-Green, 1988: 163; Alubo, 2004). By 1972, Nigeria introduced the Nigerian Indigenization Policy⁴⁷ (Ogbuagu, 1983: 250). This was perhaps a reaction to newly gained independence and a realization that the Nigerian economy was dominated by foreign nationals such as the Lebanese (Ibid: 242, 243).

“Blaming the alien”

The Lebanese during nationalism

“The working class of the towns, the masses of the unemployed, the small artisans and craftsmen ... line up behind this nationalist attitude; but in all justice let it be said, they only follow in the steps of their bourgeoisie [...] From nationalism we have passed to ultranationalism, to chauvinism, and finally to racism. These foreigners are called on to leave; their shops are burned, their street stalls are wrecked ...” (Fanon, 1990: 125).

Within the years of nationalistic struggles and economic and political turmoil, the Lebanese of Nigeria were dealt additional cards of hostility. It can be argued that perhaps “the politics of nationalism founded on stressing indigeneity lay at the root of postcolonial xenophobia” (Neocosmos, 2008: 587) contributing to the already hostile attitude against the Lebanese.

By the 1920s, Elite African resentment against their presence was reflected in a resolution at a meeting of the National Congress of British West Africa calling for their repatriation as “undesirables and a menace to the good government of the land” (Boahen, 2000: 128).

What is interesting to note here is that during the 1930s, the Lebanese were supported to an extent by the colonial administration, who believed the Lebanese were loyal to them and, hence, perhaps believed this loyalty translated into support for them (Falola, 1990: 547). As a result, their “ability as traders was always praised” and they were considered “more intelligent and astute”, having “undoubtedly greater commercial knowledge at present than most Africans” (Ibid: 548), views that perhaps fuelled the existing hostility of the Nigerians towards them.

By the 1930s, the region faced economic depression, and resentment against the Lebanese once again mounted, “following in the historic pattern of blaming the alien commercial classes for economic downturns”, feelings that carried on strongly into the 1940s and 50s (Akyeampong, 2006: 311).

Indeed, in the late 40s, nationalists expressed their growing resentment at the “economic domination of the country by foreign nationals” (Ogbuagu, 1983: 243). Around the same time, talks of naturalization⁴⁸ emerged, and it “involved a long bureaucratic process” (Falola, 1990: 550). “By 1959 only a total of sixteen Lebanese had been granted naturalization, in spite of the large number of applicants” (Falola, 1990: 551).

By independence, this hostile attitude towards any foreign presence, combined with the reclamation of political and economic space, pushed forward the subject of a post-colonial polity that could include non-blacks as part of the national identity, and culminated in a rejection of dual citizenship⁴⁹ by all West African nations (Akyeampong, 2006: 314). And by independence, there were strong nationalistic sentiments⁵⁰ still present in Nigeria – albeit reduced of its Pan-African tones – and the common theme regarding Nigerianization “was the freeing of the country from economic colonialism and all elements of neo-colonialism” (Ogbuagu, 1983: 246).

This section concludes that with this “strong surge of nationalism”, economic efficiency may have been “sacrificed in the drive to replace foreign nationals with indigenous Nigerians in the economic sector” (Ibid: 241-242).

“A native or a settler”

In conclusion

“The obvious objection is that people who do not deserve to be African will be admitted. But how does one deserve Africanness – or, indeed, any other identity?” (Friedman, 2004: 33).

In its struggle to decolonize, Nigeria faced the dilemma of addressing the past without reproducing it (Mamdani, 2005: 12). This paper has attempted to present the problems faced in the conceptualization of a non-black identity as part of a (constructed) unified black polity by looking at a history of tense interactions between the Lebanese of Nigeria and Nigerians since the former’s arrival in the 19th century.

A perceived auxiliary presence to colonialism, the Lebanese brought to the surface various conflicts and frustrations that led to certain exclusionary policies, discriminatory attitudes, racializations and the practice of blaming the alien. This is not to say questionable business interactions on the part of the Lebanese did not exist. But this alone has never warranted the exclusion of any ethnic group in Nigeria’s history to its present national polity, at least following its independence.

Beyond essentialist concepts of race, nation and citizenship, and beyond disreputable economic practices by individuals in a group of many, this paper has attempted to provide a holistic overview of different factors that come into play when a nation goes through difficult periods of colonialism, nationalism, and independence, and how the conceptualization and placement of a non-black group in the formation of an independent national identity can to be problematic.

It argues that “[d]ifficulties in assimilating into the host society due to its notions of race and nationalism, often a result of colonialism, encourage the development” (Leichtman, 2005: 681) of strong ties with former nation of origin than with current nation of residence. It argues that perhaps these immigrants of yesterday may not have attempted at being a more assimilated group of today because of a feeling of disenfranchisement:

“Here, then, is the structural dilemma: the commodity economy dynamizes, but the state penalizes those more dynamic by defining them as settlers. Even with the colonial power gone, we keep on defining every citizen as either a native or a settler”⁵¹ (Mamdani, 2005: 12).

The negative interactions between Nigerians and Lebanese should not be overemphasized but they should not be ignored as well. Thus, whatever the opinion of their business practices and presence may be, as Kaninko states, “it must be noted that prejudiced people are disposed to regard their hostilities as natural and as fully justified by virtue of the misbehaviour of the minority groups whom they dislike” (1973: 104).

By looking at different factors – from colonial constructions of the nation as a black space; to the influence of Pan-Africanism on nationalistic tones; to essentialist arguments tying nation to race; to struggles of freeing the country from the collective dehumanization and oppressive presence of colonialism – this paper has attempted to highlight a situation where blame has been largely laid on the Lebanese with no reflection on the significance of other factors.

Through a glimpse at stormy periods in Nigeria’s history, its rich ethnic makeup, periods of attempted secessions, and the resulting coerced unified identity, we observe that a national identity based on a common “racial” identifier is perhaps largely arbitrary, brings up questions of authenticity, eligibility and entitlement, and of the degree to which one should identify with a nation in order to be part of it.

Finally, this paper acknowledges that Lebanese should strive for belongingness, participation and reciprocity in Nigeria, but also contends the degree of measurement of each of these factors. As Mamdani (2005) states:

“We need to recognize that the past and the future overlap, as do culture and politics, but they are not the same thing. Cultural communities rooted in a common past do not necessarily have a common future. [...] political communities are defined, in the final analysis, not by a common past but by a resolve to forge a common future under a single political roof, regardless of how different or similar their pasts may be” (Ibid: 14).

Endnotes

1. Tripoli is the largest city in the North of Lebanon and the second largest city in Lebanon.
2. What he is referring to is the increasingly unstable situation in Nigeria, as sectarian attacks across the country threaten to “plunge African’s largest oil producer into chaos” (Dockery, 2012).
3. Apapa is a major port city in Lagos, Nigeria.
4. There are two different names given for the murder suspect, Bilal Fahs (Ogbo, 2012) and Bilal Dilale (Ezeobi, 2012).
5. Lagos is a port city and the most populous city in Nigeria. It was the capital of Nigeria from 1914 till 1991 (Wikipedia, 2012).
6. Naira (₦) is the currency of Nigeria.
7. See Dockery, 2012 for source of population estimation.
8. Research for this paper could not find a specific reference for the case in Nigeria, but this point can perhaps be illustrated with the case of the Lebanese in Senegal, where by independence many Lebanese obtained Senegalese citizenship and resented “the fact that although they have Senegalese citizenship, they are not considered Senegalese and they remain identified as Lebanese” (Leichtman, 2005: 679):

“They hold Senegalese nationality, speak the national languages fluently, and eat the local cuisine, yet their white skin has been a differentiating factor [...] In Senegal, they are defined as Lebanese, although they realize upon returning to Lebanon that they are no longer Lebanese” (Ibid: 664).
9. I am using the definition of racialization as the “dynamic process by which racial concepts, categories and divisions come to structure and embed themselves in arenas of social life” (Law, 2010: 59).
10. “My mother bore me in the southern wild,
And I am black, but o! my soul is white;
White as an angel is the English child;
But I am black as if bereav'd of light.”

- From William Blake's "Little Black Boy", *The Poetry and Prose of William Blake*:
(As quoted in Brantlinger, 1985: 168).
11. Emphasis chosen to highlight how contemporary expressions of identity also place Africa as one entity and places its north as separate, in this case the chosen song lyrically places Egypt separate from Africa.

12. A good example of this subjective positioning is from an entry in May Crawford's 1913 autobiography on missionary life in Kenya:

"With the coming of the British," she says, "dawned a somewhat brighter" day for Kenya. [...] "Loving darkness rather than light," she continues, the "natives" "resent all that makes for progress."²⁵ Perhaps what the Kenyans resented was the British intrusion into their country, *but this Crawford could not see*' (Brantlinger, 1985: 179, *emphasis added*).

13. "[...] missionaries were strongly tempted to exaggerate "savagery" and "darkness" in order to rationalize their presence in Africa, to explain the frustrations they experienced making converts, and to win support from missionary societies at home" (Brantlinger, 1985: 178).

14. Go to *Appendix . Annex I* for: images from the colonial partitioning of Africa that perhaps illustrate how the blackness, sin, sexuality and savagery of Africa were constructed and re-presented through imagery, a subjective re-presentation of the continent; and for scanned pages that perhaps show the subjective mindset of missionaries of the time – their preconceived conceptions of and objectives in Africa.

15. It should be noted that the Lebanese people have been migrating in large numbers and through many waves ever since the 19th century, and were also referred to as Syrians, "a name commonly used in the western world to denote the area which is now included in the states of Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Israel" (Hourani, 1992: 3). For more on their migration patterns, reasons and destinations, a good source to check is the book "The Lebanese in the World: A Century of Emigration" (Hourani and Shehadi, 1992).

16. Examples of their level of settlement and establishment range from an involvement in the buying, exporting and smuggling of diamonds from Sierra Leone and the establishment of smuggling routes that led to Lebanon (Van der Laan, 1965); taking family disputes to local court regarding land owned in Nigeria (Woodman, 1976); the presence of individuals who were active members of the Bloc Democratique Senegalais of Leopold Senghor in Senegal (Boumedouha, 1992); their concentration in Nigeria "ranked first among the former British colonies" by the 1960s (Misra, 1992: 556); and many Lebanese men were involved in relationships with women from Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Senegal, with estimates in 1963 of 2,000 to 5,000 mixed ethnicity children resulting from these unions in each of these countries (Khuri, 1968: 90).

17. Go to *Appendix . Annex I* for images that illustrate the Lebanese presence in Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast.

18. Maiduguri is the capital and largest city of Borno State in north-eastern Nigeria.

19. Cotonou is the largest city and economic capital of the Republic of Benin.

20. Although accusations of the Lebanese's impudent disregard for African women are real and understandable, these objections from both the Lebanese and Sierra Leonean sides also present perhaps a subjective masculine voice that omits the possibility and accounts of the social mobility and voluntary associations of women (Little, 1972), placing them all solely as victims in this discourse. In Kaniki's account of the Lebanese presence in Sierra Leone, he cites a different (albeit simplified and equally sexist), perspective with the following quote:

This "improper sexual behaviour" [sic] was "naturally bitterly resented by the Creole population".⁶⁰ But the Commissioner of Police, Mr. Heslip, saw the problem in a different

perspective. While he agreed that "another source of grievance is the number of girls of important Creole families, who prostituted with Syrians", he observed that "The Syrians keep these girls well supplied with clothes and dash, and the weakness of Creole girls for fine clothes is, I think, well known" (Kaniki, 1973: 105).

21. According to Ong, utilitarian familialism refers "to the normative and practical tendencies whereby" families "place family interest above all other individual and social concerns" (Ong et al, 748).

22. It should also be noted that Lebanese society is highly patriarchal and patrilineal (Charafeddine, 2009: 7; BBC, 2011) and Lebanese generally avoid intermarrying outside their religious sect and region. This patrilineal aspect is deeply entrenched in Lebanon as a culture, a culture which Lebanese seem to perpetuate even outside Lebanon, and may also explain why there have been much more cases of Lebanese men who marry African women but not vice versa.

23. This was the reaction towards the still relatively new Lebanese presence in Sierra Leone, during the famous anti-Lebanese rice riots of July and August 1919 (Kaniki, 1973).

24. During the 19th and 20th century emigration waves of Lebanon, a lot of Shi'a Muslims headed to West Africa. In Lebanon, this group were at the bottom of the social hierarchy of identities, and "[...] the integration of 'Africa' into Lebanese cultural hierarchies facilitated a sort of cultural 'upward mobility' for the Shi'a. [...] 'Africa' has occupied a particular niche in the Lebanese 'hierarchy of value,' one that was even more degraded than [the Lebanese Shi'a]" (Weiss, 2007: 51).

25. This level of competition was mild and the policies mentioned were in the 1940s regarding railway and trade restrictions; "traders were prevented from using lorries", a line of business dominated by the Lebanese, and later on further restrictions were made "which included conservation of fuel, prohibition of lorries on certain routes, allocation of quotas, and so on" (Falola, 1990: 538).

26. There were instances in the region where the source of hostility towards the Lebanese stemmed from Europeans: such as in Ivory Coast where poor whites accused them "of creating a health hazard because of their lack of hygiene; thus 61 Lebanese were expelled from the Ivory Coast between 1928 and 1938" Bigo, 1992: 512); and Senegal where journalist Maurice Voisin used his weekly newspaper, *Les Échos de l'Afrique Noire* (interesting here the choice of title, "black Africa") "to publicize the case against the Lebanese and to protect French traders", and he also formed a short-lived anti-Lebanese organization called Les Amis du Petit Jules, that advocated the use of violence against Lebanese (Boumedouha, 1992: 556).

27. This middleman role was partially due to marketing boards that were "established to handle the main cash crops. The Boards had the power to purchase and export cocoa, palm produce, cotton, and groundnuts. [...] The opportunity in cocoa trade for the Lebanese was diminished, for only a few were given licences to purchase. Again, they survived by working as agents to the big firms which had been granted quotas" (Falola, 1990: 538).

28. It is interesting to note that this "term was never applied to the European firms, though they advanced credit and bought produce for resale" (Williams, 1985: 10).

29. Public reaction against the Lebanese in Nigeria has dated as far back as 1938 when the Oni of Ife asked for the prohibition of Lebanese trading in that area, perhaps interesting considering that the 1931 census stated the number of Syrians and Lebanese in the whole of Nigeria to be only 419 (Bauer, 1954: 157).

30. Former Nigerian politician (Misra, 1992: 566).

31. Their supporters included people like one federal minister Kola Balogun, the Nigerian economic historian, R. O. Ekundare, and non-African scholars such as Peter Bauer who stated:

“Levantines in West Africa represent types of immigrants who have an important part to perform in the economic development of many underdeveloped countries... In West Africa, as in many other parts of the world, the immigrants who could contribute the most to economic development are regarded with the greatest suspicion” (as quoted in Misra, 1992: 566).

32. For example, the Oba of Benin acknowledged their contribution in 1930:

“I am glad to say that since the arrival of these people to Benin, the town has been gradually improving and quite good. The poor are given all possible assistance and could buy stuffs such as they can always be proud of them. They are the sort of people by which civilization comes to a country and can help a country” (as quoted in Falola, 1990: 529).

33. That is, a national identity based on colonial constructs of the continent; and on certain ideologies that made problematic the conceptualization of any non-black identity as part of Nigeria’s ethnoscape.

34. “It has also been demonstrated that Garvey was indebted to West African thinkers such as J. E. Casely Hayford, Africanus Horton, and Edward Blyden for many of his racial ideas” (Okonkwo, 1980: 105).

35. In addition, one must not forget the political activities of African sojourners abroad, whose political organizations, such as the West African Students’ Union, were influential in West Africa and throughout the diaspora, and who contributed to distinctive West African political aims but may have also influenced them through their diasporic experiences, changing political identities and consciousness (Hakim, 2000).

36. Indeed, there was even a U.N.I.A. (Universal Negro Improvement Association) branch established in Lagos, and his impact was as such that the “conservative Nigerian Pioneer wrote on 26 November [1920]: ‘We advise the Police to keep an eye on the Garveyites in Nigeria.’” (Langley, 1969: 160).

37. “William Essuman Gwira Sekyi (or Kobina Sekyi), Gold Coast [Ghana] philosopher, nationalist, lawyer and traditionalist” (Langley, 1969: 164).

37. This was in the 1920s (Langley, 1969: 170).

38. The Hausa are one of the largest ethnic groups in West Africa.

39. It should be noted that in contemporary Nigeria, questions of indigeneity and authenticity also affected its ethnic groups, a problem highlighted by former President Obasanjo in 2002:

“Many citizens are threatened and denied their God-given and constitutionally guaranteed right to live and earn their living anywhere in our nation by such monstrosities as ‘non-indigene’, ‘stranger’, ‘native’ or ‘settler’ constructions which create huge barriers between our people. Very often, the irony is lost to our people that every Nigerian is both an ‘indigene’ and a ‘settler’ and we pay a huge price when we ignore this fact... it exposes all of us and all our primordial loyalties to the evils which it generates... it militates against the imperative of the integration of our national economy which demands that men and capital must be allowed to move freely and grow wherever they choose” (Obasanjo as quoted in Alubo, 2004: 145).

40. It should be noted that with the approaching independence in 1960, when “it was clear that the constitutional changes would transfer power to Nigerians, ambitious politicians dropped the ideals of Pan-Africanism and even of a national conscious and created strong regional political parties”, politicians such as Azikiwe and Chief Obafemi Awolowo (Falola, 2001: 115, 116).

41. Nigeria’s famous pioneer nationalist who pushed for the freedom of the nation through the transfer of power and immediate self government (Falola, 2001: 60, 101).

42. Azikiwe was educated in the United States, persuaded by the ideas of Du Bois and influenced by the Pan-Africanist ideas of Marcus Garvey (Falola, 2001: 103, 104) but later gave up a lot of his pan-Africanist activism for Nigerian politics (Ibid: 104).

43. Alubo (2004: 137) puts this number at 270. Indeed, “Nigeria brings together more people and more ethnic groups than any other African country” (Nayar, 1975: 324).

44. Based on accusations of inflating figures (Tamuno, 1993: 574).

45. The Biafran War is the “thirty-month civil war in Nigeria that ended on January 1, 1970” (Nayar. 1975: 321).

46. It should be noted that in contemporary Nigeria, many of its “constituent units are regrouping under regional ethnic umbrellas, and thereby not only threatening nationhood but also nurturing the possibility of dissolving into ethnic kingdoms. It is argued that Nigeria’s recent experiences of ethnic disturbances are consequences of the failure of its nation-building strategy that has long negated ethnic identity and a true sense of belonging for some ethnic groups” (Alubo, 2004: 135).

47. The Indigenization Decree had specific provisions that mostly affected the Lebanese, Indians and Greek communities of Nigeria (Ogbuagu, 1983: 251), and its effectiveness is somewhat contested. Hoogvelt (1979: 67) argues that “whilst indigenisation has helped to redirect foreign investments into industrial activities and has moreover greatly enhanced the reported size of these industrial activities, it has not yet had a corresponding effect on the amount of labour employed in industry”.

48. “The major grip of the colonial administration on the Lebanese was exercised through [...] regulations on naturalization. Some of these regulations were not made public, such as the monitoring of the activities of aliens who stayed in hotels¹⁰¹ and the provision to expel convicted aliens from the country” (Falola, 1990: 548).

49. As nations demand loyalty through single citizenship, some have noted that “the propensity for dual citizenship appears negatively linked to indicators of host country integration (Bloemraad, 2004: 392). Today, there are still debates on plural citizenship rights in Nigeria, and its constitution still bars office holding by dual nationals (Spiro, 2010:129).


50. Other African nations exhibited strong nationalistic sentiments against perceived colonial auxiliary presences. For instance, within a year of independence, Sierra Leone amended its constitutional provisions on citizenship to require anyone seeking nationality to be “of negro African descent,” a move that seemed “directed against the less than 1 per cent of the country’s population known collectively as ‘Lebanese’, whose parents and grandparents settled in Sierra Leone from the Middle East” (Manby, 2009: 12).

Another well-known case was in 1972, when Uganda’s Asians were given 90 days to leave the country. Decades after Idi Amin expelled over 60,000 of them, “discrimination against new or returned Ugandan Asians is ingrained” (Lattimer, 2001: 3). This discrimination is best illustrated when, in the early 1990s, returned Ugandan Asians started a pressure group to be added to the country’s list of ethnic groups. Their bid was rejected (Mamdani, 2005: 12).

51. As mentioned in note 36, there are problems being faced concerning the movement of “indigenous” ethnic groups within contemporary Nigeria, a situation that also utilizes the language of “settlers” versus “indigenes”. The “assailed ethnic groups are frequently referred to as ‘settlers’ by other groups who claim to be ‘indigenes’ of particular geo-political spaces. In these contestations, the same language once used to rally Nigerians of diverse origins in the anti-colonial struggles has resurfaced” (Alubo, 2004: 136).

Appendix
Annex I

The images are “Victorians The Myth of the Dark Continent” 1985).



following taken from and Africans: Genealogy of the Dark (Brantlinger,

FIG. 4.—Livingstone as a saint, carrying the light of Christianity into the Dark Continent. William Garden Blaikie, *The Personal Life of David Livingstone*, 1880.

(Brantlinger, 1985: 177)

Appendix
Annex I

The following images are taken from "Victorians and Africans: The Genealogy of the Myth of the Dark Continent" (Brantlinger, 1985).



FIG. 5.—A typical portrayal of African religion as idol or devil worship. Herbert Ward, *Five Years with the Congo Cannibals*, 1890.

(Brantlinger, 1985: 180)

Appendix
Annex I

The following images are taken from "Victorians and Africans: The Genealogy of the Myth of the Dark Continent" (Brantlinger, 1985).

(Brantlinger, 1985: 183)

Appendix
Annex I

The following
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


FIG. 6
Africa. Pt
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FIG. 7.—"The human butcher shop." Thomas Henry Huxley, *Man's Place in Nature*, 1863.

(Brantlinger, 1985: 185)

Appendix
Annex I

The following images are taken from "Victorians and Africans: The Genealogy of the Myth of the Dark Continent" (Brantlinger, 1985).





FIG. 9.—Henry Stanley resisting temptation. J. W. Buel, *Heroes of the Dark Continent*, 1898.

(Brantlinger, 1985: 195)

Appendix


Annex I

The following scanned pages are taken from "The Missionary Impact on Modern Nigeria" (Ayandele, 1966).



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Appendix
Annex I

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Appendix
Annex I

The following images are taken from "The Lebanese in the World: A Century of Emigration"
(Hourani and Shehadi, 1992).



Plate 12 Lebanese shops, Kenema, Sierra Leone 1966

Appendix
Annex I

The following images are taken from "The Lebanese in the World: A Century of Emigration"
(Hourani and Shehadi, 1992).

Plate 13 Neil Leighton with Lebanese shopkeepers,
Kenema, Sierra Leone 1966



Annex I

The following images are taken from “The Lebanese in the World: A Century of Emigration” (Hourani and Shehadi, 1992).



Appendix
Annex I

The following images are taken from “The Lebanese in the World: A Century of Emigration” (Hourani and Shehadi, 1992).



Plate 32 Some members of the Lebanese Women's Charitable Association with the Ivoirian Women's Association

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