The enduring reality of racialization in Côte d'Ivoire

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Introduction

''In the racial future, I venture to predict, there will be a combination of greater flexibility in the understanding of racial identity on the one hand, and a deepening structural racism on the other''. (Winant, 2006, pp.999)

Côte d'Ivoire is a deeply divided nation with racialized conflict becoming the normalised form of political protest. Its distinctly diverse heritage of French colonial and traditional African legacies is apparent both in its name and prominent languages. A clear and lasting legacy of colonial rule is their official national French language, which is spoken alongside over 60 recognised dialects of Dioula, traditional West African Mande languages. Due to this diversity Côte D'Ivoire was regarded as a real beacon of hope for multi-racial societies.

However, like many countries Côte d'Ivoire experiences elements of racism and this article seeks to outline the causes of, and the forms which, this racism takes. Built on a political hotbed of instability much of Côte d'Ivoire's conflict surrounds the intense divide between its Muslim and Christian cultures. The vicious and often undemocratic battle for power between Laurent Gbagbo and Alassane Ouattara has scarred Côte d'Ivoire with thousands displaced and many more brutally killed in acts of religious persecution. With this in mind, one must first consider the background of Côte d'Ivoire which has provided the tools for this bloody battle. Alongside this, consideration must be given to Gbagbo's regime which sought to remove any non-Christian Ivorians and to create a true nation of 'Ivorites'. Gbagbo was merely the figurehead of an incredibly popular regime and consideration must be given to other examples of localised conflict. Yet, after his removal from power much of the conflict has remained and his successor Alassane Ouattara faces a long and painful road to redemption. His mainly Muslim support base was forced to endure years of oppression under Gbagbo and this article will consider their violence against Gbagbo's men since his abdication.

Côte d'Ivoire has witnessed an epidemic of racist violence after previous elections including the death of over 3000 people during the 2010/2011 post-election crisis which saw the removal of Laurent Gbagbo, (Wells, 2013). Torture, beatings and murder were all commonplace and Côte d'Ivoire's unique culmination of racist tension must be understood in relation to global and colonial influences. Moreover, rape as a weapon of war is the type of heinous crime which sadly perpetuates much of African politics. Consideration must be given as to why such inhumane attacks are commonplace when ethnic rivalries come to the boil.

Finally, Côte d'Ivoire has an extremely varied population demographic with millions of immigrants settling here over the last 40 years, or so. Many of them they lived alongside the natives in relative harmony but the economic instability which has recently dogged Côte d'Ivoire has eradicated much of this peace. Particularly under Gbagbo, an Ivorian patriotism was upheld and many immigrants faced a barrage of attacks and anti-foreign sentiment. President Ouattara has sought to rectify this desolate situation but much of the ingrained hostility still endures. Primarily using the work of Frank Dikötter and David Goldberg, but with reference to others, an attempt will be made to accurately theorize racialization in Côte d'Ivoire and highlight just why contemporary discourses of racial theory are not always adequate, needing improvement if we are too truly under these processes. This study of Côte d'Ivoire will demonstrate just how far this once proud nation has to go to realise the

lofty expectations it was once afforded. With consideration of its political past and present attitudes it must be concluded that Côte d'Ivoire's instability will rumble on unless there is radical change.

A cultural melting pot

Akan 42.1%, Voltaiques (Voltaic) or Gur 17.6%, Northern Mandes 16.5%, Krous 11%, Southern Mandes 10%, other 2.8% (includes 130,000 Lebanese and 14,000 French) (1998)
A report by The Arda emphatically supports President Ouattara's rhetoric of a Côte d'Ivoire for all, reporting extremely low levels of religious minority discrimination and high levels of religious freedom in Côte d'Ivoire, especially when compared to many of its West African associates. Furthermore, the (2004) Special Rapporteur report outlines a culture without traditional xenophobia due to its diverse multi ethnic history, but recognises an undercurrent of tension which is threatening to boil over.
It is evident that the general image portrayed by Côte d'Ivoire, of harmony and acceptance, is largely correct but ,with differing cultures cohabiting, there are inevitable risks of disagreement due to differing belief systems. Despite government claims to the contrary it is simply not plausible to suggest that there are no forms of racism and racialization in Côte d'Ivoire. Indeed, a continent of instability -such as Africa- is concomitant to ethnic disagreement and one of the most explicit manifestations of this is the long struggle between the Muslim and Christian populations of Côte d'Ivoire. In recent years this struggle has been played out in the political sphere with intense hostilities between a series of Roman Catholic leaders, notably Laurent Gbagbo and their Muslim counterparts, particularly the incumbent President Alassane Ouattara. The 21st century has seen a perpetual cycle of struggle between these two and although the exact number of followers of each religion are fiercely contested, the general consensus is that around 40% of the population are Muslim, 35% Christian, 24.5% Ethnoreligionist and around 0.5% agnostic or other, as roughly estimated by The Arda. Per contra too much of the public rhetoric, there really does appear to be an ingrained hostility in Côte d'Ivoire.
Much of the apparent hostility can be explained through consideration of the historical migration of Muslims to Côte d'Ivoire. Sany (2010) outlines the fact the Muslim/ Christian relationship was hierarchical and exploitative from the outset. The 1960's/70's saw a real swelling of the Muslim population in Côte d'Ivoire, particularly in the North, as Christian traders welcomed immigrants as a cheap way of staffing their booming cocoa businesses. Many Muslims became so successful that they purchased land and began to run their own businesses. However when cocoa prices began to fall a few years later real hostility developed towards them. Many Christians demanded their land was returned and perceived the Muslims as the real cause of the decline. This lay the foundations for the civil war which followed in the coming years.
Under President Gbagbo many Southern Muslims were forced to hide their religion for fear of persecution and research by Martin Lewis (2011) suggests that the actual percentage of Ivorian Muslims could be around 60%. This is in direct contrast to the work of McIntyre and Christopher (1998) which suggest that a mere 12% were Muslim, 25 % Christian and a massive 63% followed African religions. Therefore, in the 14 years since Gbagbo first came to power there has been a large shift away from tradition and towards Christianity and Islam. Although the data as a whole may not be entirely accurate that much is evident. Because of this shift and the reports of religious persecution it is highly probable that many are fearful of revealing their true religion and thus simply realign themselves with the prominent faith at the time. Many people were intimidated by government officials and there is certainly a strong sense of fear amongst Ivorians that they face punishment if they are honest about their religious beliefs, (Meehan, 2011).

Why the statistics matter:
Currently experiencing somewhat of a population boom since this data was recorded, Côte d'Iviore's permanent population has soared by over 50% from 15 million to 22 million. Although this growth has been reasonably evenly spread across Côte d'Ivoire it is the constant flow of migrants that underpins much of the ethnic tension and conflict which Côte d'Ivoire has experienced in recent years. Furthermore,

with many immigrants classed as illegal- or fundamentally inferior- under the rule of former president Laurent Gbagbo it is hard to quantify exactly who is native to Côte d'Ivoire and who is unaccounted for as an illegal migrant. Alongside this, there are severe difficulties in obtaining and proving citizenship for those who are of foreign descent, even including those who are 2nd or 3rd generation descendants of immigrants. Significantly, Gbagbo was able to use this ruling to prevent his main challenger Alassane Ouattara from rivalling his Presidency for many years, as only true 'Ivorites' were allowed to stand for parliament or vote. Although this segregational form of constitutional racialization was implemented just before Gbagbo came to office in 2000, he was able to harbour much of this anti-Muslim sentiment and use it in his campaign. Thusly, this marginalized much of Ouattara's immigrant/ Muslim support. Just how many people Gbagbo was preaching against is unclear, but the United Nations produced a Special Rapporteur report in 2004 estimating that 26% of the population were immigrants. Gbagbo's pro Ivorian party effectively restricted over 5 million people from taking part in this supposed 'democracy' and it was this racist marginalization which caused much of the violent unrest followed.

What is the origin of Ivorite?
The use of the word Ivorite has become a very controversial and divisive element of Ivorian politics. When the term Ivorite was originally coined by Henri Konan Bédié in 1995, he aimed to reinforce a sense of national identity and repair the divide that was emerging between Côte d'Ivoire's ethnic communities. However, as Sany (2010, pp.4) notes the reality has been far different as Ivorite has become "a factor of exclusion from political participation and citizenship for some citizens alleged to be immigrants from neighboring countries". The extremely severe and divisive economic recession resulted in a chiasmic rift between the locals and the migrants as the migrants and this rift has been perpetuated by this creation of a national identity.

Gbagbo's use of Ivorite and pro Ivorian nationalism
Gbagbo's use of Ivorite became a pivotal part of his election strategy with it becoming an almost interchangeable term meaning his Pro Christian support base. Enforcing the idea that Côte d'Ivoire should benefit only benefit native Ivorians the politicization of ethnicity has become commonplace. Muslims had property rights removed and thus lost livelihoods and homes. This exemplifies Gbagbo's apparent wish to ostracize much of Ouattara's mainly Muslim northern support base preventing them from having any political influence. As well as restrictions upon political participation Gbagbo's anti- Muslim agenda also culminated in a series of violent attacks. One of the worst manifestations of this violence occurred in ''the Abidjan suburb of Youpougon, where gendarmes slaughtered 57 individuals and dumped them in a mass grave because they were Muslim or had ''northern names'', Dickovick (2014,pp.83). This dehumanizing of Muslims, treating them as one entity, is prevalent throughout many of Gbagbo's attacks. The violence often undertook the same form as his anti-immigrant violence which will be discussed later, but with one vital difference. Gbagbo was actually fighting against something, or namely someone the now President Ouattara's rebel forces. This intense instability ultimately literally resulted in the countries division with Guillaume Soro leading a Muslim coup, seizing the countries north. Côte d'Ivoire was plunged into Civil War for the next 5 years but ever since its official end in 2007, Côte d'Ivoire has remained a country very much on the brink until Gbagbo's removal in 2011. The International Crisis Group (2007) particularly expressed real hope that the Ouagadouga peace agreement, which outlined a series of pro peace measures, would result in political harmony, but despite Abou Cisse's (2014) protestations that Gbagbo was a source of good for Islam, this wasn't the case.

Gbagbo's violent approach to immigration
Gbagbo's 'Ivorite' policies may officially be no more but much of legacy of his politicized ethnic hostility remains (Meehan, 2011). The Burkinabe population in particular face a long struggle to find peace again as Gbagbo's brutal marginalisation decimated much of their livelihood. One notable example of this animosity becoming something more serious occurred in Bonoua, in the early years of the 21st Century. After a disagreement between

an Abouré and a Burkinabe watchmen, culminating in the Abouré being knocked to the ground, an Abouré youth movement went on the rampage against the settled Burkinabe, destroying over 70 shops and homes, (Colin et al, 2004)

The Abouré belong to Côte d'Ivoire's largest ethnic grouping the Akan community and the Burkinabe originally hail from nearby Burkina Faso. The Akan provided Gbagbo's with his core support group and it is highly probable that his quest for power provided the catalyst for conflict to begin. Ironically the Akan themselves of are Ghanian descent but have resided in Côte d'Ivoire since the 18th Century, (US Embassy, 2010).

This deep rooted hostility against the Burkinabe was apparent for some time but it took this general wave of pro Ivorite sentiment to inspire an uprising. Much of the anti-immigrant feeling surrounds what Ivorian's perceive as unfair bias towards Burkinabe in terms of the leasing out of plantation land. As such, many Ivorian's became increasingly frustrated with Burkinabe businesses which they perceived as detrimental to their own aspirations. Pro Gbagbo youth movements attempted to pass a series of initiatives to deliberately marginalise and discriminate against the Burkinabe. They provided the local council with a document outlining 'a set of restrictive rules regarding foreigners in the Abouré country: among other things, it imposed a curfew on them, declared an Abouré monopoly over all trading and transport activities, prohibited marriage between Abouré and foreigners, and prohibited leasing out them land', (Colin et al, 2004, pp.27) This officialised the general anti-immigrant racialization which had been bubbling under the surface.

Ultimately these demands were rejected as illegal by the local court but the message of anti-Burkinabe/ anti-foreign sentiment was clear. Although active racist violence ultimately died down, here, anti-Burkinabe feeling is still very strongly apparent. Cook (2012) demonstrates that this animosity towards foreigners is not isolated to the countries south and can be traced across Côte d'Ivoire. In an interview with a local Djimini man, a region in Côte d'Ivoire's north we hear a prime example of the recurring anti-foreigner sentiment:

"They earn too much money! They go back home with the money; over 1000 Burkinabè in Djimini, how many have built a house here?.... They do not contribute to the life of the village. They have children but they send their girls back home, so they should leave our women in peace" (Colin et al, 2004, pp. 27).

The idea that the Burkinabe are in some way inferior is particularly evident when he suggests that they are not worthy of Ivorian women. A clear hierarchical form of racialization is apparent here and it's particularly significant that this racist sentiment is reported in the countries north. It is the north which is often portrayed as the enemy of Gbagbo, a Muslim stronghold which welcomes immigration. As highlighted by the Special Rapporteur (2004) reports it seems that there very much was not a tradition of Xenophobia, but one can certainly see a Xenophobia in contemporary times.

He goes onto refer to the Tabou conflict of 1999 as the catalyst for change in Côte d'Iviore. Here, violence erupted in the countries South West between the two indigenous Northern communities which eventually induced the expulsion of foreigners and once more the Burkinabe, (Colin, 2004). This idea of a trigger point is vital to understanding the root of Gbagbo's wave of popularity as it becomes increasingly evident that Côte d'Ivoire has had a recognition of race but never conflict because of it, until Gbagbo provided the catalyst.

However, ironically Gbagbo's regime may have had the opposite effect to what he intended. Contrary to many reports, Côte d'Ivoire has increasing numbers of native Ivorian's being forced to flee to the country not because of migrant violence but ironically due to the violence of those who swear to protect them. Dickovick (2014) reports this going onto outline Gbagbo's belief that neighbouring countries, such as Burkina Faso, armed the rebel movement which aimed to remove him from power. This simply reinforced the anti-Burkinabe/ foreign sentiment which had dogged Côte d'Ivoire for a generation. The Human Rights Watch (2011) state that Gbagbo's men ''beat foreign residents to death with bricks, clubs, and sticks, or doused them with gas and burned them alive'' (pp.1) kidnapping others and executing them at point blank range. Anti-migrant violence swelled to epic proportion under Gbagbo as ''the beating or burning to death of at least 14 West African nationals, as well as the widespread looting of numerous shops and houses they own'' (pp.1). Frequently, the literature around Gbagbo emphasizes just how brutal his anti-

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immigrant violence was and just how his process of racializing Côte d'Ivoire resulted in terrible consequences.

Ouattara as the beacon of hope?

Although this hostility anti- Immigrant remains it is worth considering the recent move by Gbagbo's successor Ouattara to publicly welcome back an ex Burkinabe leader to Côte d'Iviore's late last year, (VOA, 2014). Furthermore, this is not the only move made by the current government to bridge the Burkinabe/ Ivorian gap as immediately upon his eventual election, in 2011, Ouattara proclaimed that "Every single Burkinabe should consider himself at home in Ivory Coast," (Ouedraogo, 2011) vowing to end the xenophobia which blighted his predecessors regime.

But sadly, it seems that many of Ouattara's public claims do not accurately represent reality, at least they don't yet. Marius Piko (2013) outlines the terrible reality of exploitative child labour which befalls many Burkinabe and immigrant children. Piko, using an alias due to fear of revealing his identity, comments on this epidemic of exploitation in the financially rewarding cocoa industry. He refers to the exhaustion and deplorable living conditions that the children have to endure with little or no pay and no hope of escape. These Burkinabe children are taken from their parents in Burkina Faso with a promise of a better life and financial reward. However, the reality is that they're 21st Century slaves who often don't know who they even work for. This particular cocoa plant was controlled by Amadé Ouérémi until his arrest last year. Piko reports that since his arrest conditions have in fact deteriorated for these children with many now receiving no payment at all for their services. However, controversially Ouérémi's men fought alongside, and in support of, Ouattara when he was attempting to wrestle control away from Lauren Gbagbo. It seems perverse to suggest that Ouattara can end Burkinabe Xenophobia when one of his key supporters was the man perpetuating their struggle! Furthermore, a 2014 report by the Global Slavery Index (2014) estimated that there was 144,000 slaves working in Cote d'Ivoire with a significant proportion of them being immigrant children, demonstrating just how widespread this problem is. Christina Lamb (2001) reported on the sophisticated network of child traffickers from Benin, Mali and Burkina Faso noting that many face a bleak future. Vast amounts of the exploitative businessman originally hail from Burkina Faso themselves and as such many of their personal profits do even benefit Côte d'Ivoire as a whole. On the other hand they benefit Ivorian businessmen who have colluded with the traffickers in order to claim a stake in this extremely profitable business. It must not simply be considered a Burkinabe problem that Ivorians can do nothing about, there are clear examples of natives actively supporting, or at least indirectly benefitting, from Burkinabe 'slavery'.

The desolate, incessant nature of migrant exploitation does not seem to be abating as Côte d'Ivoire seems trapped in an endless battle between cheap labour/ short term economic gains and a wish to dispel human rights concerns and illiberal racialization. Foreigners in Côte d'Ivoire have encountered a difficult past and it seems will face a problematic future. Lamb was writing 14 years ago and she outlined Laurent Gbagbo as a real beacon of hope for change. Gbagbo is a real microcosm of Côte d'Ivoire, promising much yet delivering little. Whilst he spectacularly failed to inspire this change, Ouattara certainly appears to making a concerted effort to do so. Since he officially took office he appears to have significantly altered his attitude towards Ouérémi, and others like him, not only calling for his arrest but also declaring his intention to seize Mount Peko. Ouattara has stated that he will forcibly any Ouérémi supporter who aims to cling on to the area, vowing that this will be the first in a variety of measures to do so.

Rape as a weapon of war:

One simply cannot excuse the violence which Gbagbo inspired but the crimes committed by Ouattara cannot be ignored. Despite the current hope for President Ouattara the acts which his men committed when he was attempting to seize power must not be forgotten. The Human Rights Watch (2011) briefly outline the harrowing reports of sexual violence which Ouattara's men performed. ''In two cases, the women were raped in front of family members, and the husband and father of the victims were then arbitrarily detained and

remain "disappeared." Seven of the women were taken from their houses and raped by from one to four men in a building under construction. In all cases, the attackers voiced a clear political motive to the sexual assault''. There were almost no reports of this occurring under Gbagbo's watch and as such these crimes are easily identifiable as Ouattara's work. Gbagbo's forces were vilified for their dehumanization of victims, through beatings and torture, but Ouattara's men did exactly the same, through sexual attacks. All that has changed is the literal form of attack, the racialized sentiment has endured it has simply changed hands. For Ouattara sexual violence satisfies his wish to seem powerful, or the big man, a facet of African politics that sadly remains common even today. This is an evident legacy of colonial intervention as the leaders which publicly were perceived as the most in command received increased aid and Western support, becoming heavily reliant on exporting goods to them. Such explicit ego centric politics is not apparent anywhere else and despite Ouattara providing a change in the attitude towards migrant discrimination his regime is still dogged with many of the same problems as his predecessors. It is simply undeniable that he was privy to this violence, and extremely probable that he encouraged it also. Ivorian politics really does just seem to be old wine in new bottles with a perpetual battle between those that have power and those that wish to violently reclaim it. There is a different face at the forefront of a different party but the racialized violence remains the same. If there can be any saving grace for Ouattara at least he is not actively encouraging violence against Gbagbo's supporters now he has got in to power. Although, there can really be no forgiving the heinous crimes he committed.

Dikötter racial theory in relation to Cote d'Ivoire:
Like Gbagbo, he is keen to project an image of man who should be feared and a man with authority. This kind of politics rarely occurs in contemporary Western politics and as such many elements of contemporary race theory simply cannot be applied to Côte d'Ivoire. Despite this, elements of Côte d'Ivoire's plight can be explored with the racial theory of Frank Dikötter. He suggested that the history of race conflict is best understood via the interaction between race and science. That is to say ''racist belief systems share a common language based on science…{that} can diverge considerably according to local cognitive traditions and political agenda's'' (2008, pp.1494). This interactive approach seeks to emphasize the constant links between science and racist discourse. They are, according to Dikötter, inextricably linked as the roots of racist prejudice can always be traced back to a scientific construction of inferiority. Alas, he is not arguing that all racial prejudice stems from the same scientific constructions, he does in fact on the same page acknowledge the ''complex and changing'' nature of the relationship between science and racism''. However, he is suggesting that all forms of racist discourse stem from the field of science despite the diverse nature of its literal manifestation. Before the development of science Dikötter argues that we were race blind, it is science that has highlighted racial differences and this provides the platform for racialization in the political sphere. The types of racism change, but the root cause of it does not. Science has created a worldwide system of classification and that is race. As such, racism is global but not universal.

This is an extremely evocative rhetoric, and in the case of Côte d'Ivoire, a largely unhelpful one. For Côte d'Ivoire the idea that science has created an idea of colour and this caused racist conflict, is simply untrue. There is no clear evidence that violence in Cote d'Ivoire has followed coloured lines. Instead, it is deeply embedded religious and ethnic tensions which are the root of most violence here. Dikötter simply fails to acknowledge other forms of racist conflict such as tribal rivalries which have endured for centuries. Furthermore, throughout his writing Dikötter reinforces the suggestion that whiteness and supremacy are inextricably linked, an idea perpetually peddled by the media with the booming Chinese market of skin lightening a prominent example. The idea that an incessant desire to be white is an extremely powerful one but, Côte d'Ivoire does conform to these expectations. In fact, Côte d'Ivoire has explicitly denounced this idea with a pioneering law banning skin whitening procedures, (France-Presse, 2015) due to the potential health risks. As such, there is a very evident public opposition to Dikötter's suggestion, an opposition that is arguably on the rise under Ouattara's premiership. Moreover, Goldberg (2009) argues that "Who counts as

'black' and who counts as 'white' differs from one place to another'' (pp.1275). Even the actual idea of whiteness is a Western concept and as such does not relate to Ivorian forms of racism. This demonstrates just how little elements of racial theory have progressed as many of the concerns Cooper and Du Bois highlighted over 100 years of weak blackness/ intellectual inferiority are simply reinforced here. The argument is no longer that 'blacks' are literally inferior, it's more sophisticated than that, it is that their understanding of race has been greatly enhanced via European intervention. According to this logic, Africans were incapable of partaking in racialized warfare without Western intervention. However, this is simply not the case and Dikötter's theory cannot be considered applicable to all processes of racialization.

Dikötter's over reliance on Western theory:
Despite his proclamation of a global racism theory, the reality is this that he's developed a very Western understanding of race as a whole. Whilst his suggestion that science has ended colour blindness is appropriate, the instability within Côte d'Ivoire has not developed along the lines which Dikötter insists upon. Dikötter reinforces his suggestions with a series of case studies considering racism in America and China. His work is undoubtedly relevant to his chosen countries but his Western bias is evidently apparent, particularly in the case of China. He describes the use of evolutionary English theories which have been passed on through international trade and via colonial interventions, eventually finding their way to Asia. Dikötter is not guilty of being a racist, he is simply guilty of creating a one size fits all approach to racialization. He vastly over emphasizes the relationship between science and racism, hugely under estimating cultural and historical prejudices. The colonial legacies which have perpetuated much of the contemporary religious conflict, through unfair division of land/ prioritisation of particular cultures based on racist genomics, must be considered as a contributing factor to instability, but not the only one. Peter Uvin (1997) suggested conflict was the result of governments planting the seeds of conflict whilst the people nurtured and developed them. The colonial interventions provided the platform for conflict; but the desire of the people caused it. Uvin was referring to the Rwandan genocide but his ideas are certainly applicable to Cote d'Ivoire. There has been an acknowledgment of race for many years in Côte d'Ivoire, an acknowledgement which may result ultimately from Western scientific development. However, crucially there has not always been conflict throughout this period. Dikötter suggests that racism is the explicit result of science yet that is simply to narrow a scope. A country must have the desire for conflict it is not just purely the result of scientific constructions.

Goldberg's relational approach to racism and the future:
This idea is advocated by David Goldberg who reiterates the necessity of considering the local, cultural and political conditions of a country when theorizing the reasons behind its racialization. Goldberg denounces previous approaches as too simplistic, outlining a relational approach to understanding racism. Dikötter's comparative case studies only reinforce part of the reasoning behind global racisms. For Goldberg, 'a relational account reveals...how effects are brought about as a result of historical, political or economic, legal or cultural links...stess{ing} the (re) production of relational ties and their mutually effecting and reinforcing impacts' (2009,pp.1275/76). Goldberg develops Dikötter's suggestion that racist practices in a local environment can only be considered in relation to global forms of racism, acknowledging the over reliance on European influences on Western culture. But there is consensus between the two as they both believe that racism must be understood as a result of global practices. Whilst he advocates an increased shift away from simple compare and contrast theories, and must be commended for doing so, his insistence on this form of global racism is Goldberg's fatal flaw. It would be very foolish to suggest that no forms of racism in Côte d'Ivoire have developed because of tensions elsewhere, they undeniably have. However, despite relatively little being known about the history of Côte d'Ivoire there are reports of African invasions throughout with a prominent example being the Ghanian Akan invasion in the 18th Century (US Embassy, 2010). As such, many of the same criticisms can be given to Goldberg, an over emphasis on Western processes of understanding racialization. However, this racism does endure and we are a long way from a truly post

racialized state. Government policies such as welcoming immigrantion, removing segregated rebel controlled areas and Ouattara's public denouncing of racially motivated attacks point to a more hopeful future for Côte d'Ivoire.

Concluding remarks

Racial tension has dogged Côte d'Ivoire for decades but it took a real figurehead to harbour this tension and turn it into something more. Lauren Gbagbo regime tore apart this once stable nation and despite economic prosperity Côte d'Ivoire is no longer the diamond in Africa's crown. Years of painful processes to repair the intense divide between religions and ethnicities surely follow but frequent examples of racist violence still remain. Perhaps unexpectedly for Côte d'Ivoire Ouattara faces a fight to keep power in the 2015 elections and there is a very real risk that Côte d'Ivoire will be plunged back into an era of instability. Ouattara has been a progressive President but the atrocities which have been, and are being, committed by his supporters simply can have no justification. Reports of brutal rape and torture are still all too frequent and Ouattara's public rhetoric is not supported by the actions of his supporters. Token measures have been implemented to portray a mirage of cultural acceptance but this mirage begins to fade under close inspection. The analogy 'a leopard doesn't change its spots' is a particularly appropriate one for Côte d'Ivoire but Ouattara does at least appear to be making an effort to cover them up. Unfortunately, despite the civil war officially having long since ended it has been explicitly outlined that Cote d'Ivoire still unofficially remains an intensely divided nation. Trapped in a perpetual cycle of retributive injustices it seems a progressive and harmonious Côte d'Ivoire still remain a distant dream. Racism here is unique, and cannot be understood purely by Western theories. Historically, Côte d'Ivoire has been a one of a kind cultural melting pot, unlike their African neighbours, welcoming migrants from around the world. From the outset the colonial legacies were discussed but it is not the case that France's influence has caused all the racist tension in Côte d'Ivoire. A new perspective is needed which considers historical African rivalries alongside Western discourses of scientific and localised racialization. Winant's rather bleak original prediction may yet still be proved wrong if Ouattara's move towards a de racialized state proves successful. Côte d'Ivoire was always considered a pioneer of diverse cultural acceptance but it could well be that pioneering a new school of racialization theory is Côte d'Ivoire's salvation, one that can truly represent racism in all cultures. Until then the mantle falls to Alassane Ouattara who perhaps will finally be the inspirational figure Côte d'Ivoire needs to move towards a post racialized state.

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